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Inequality is systemic.  As a system, it reproduces itself like a
mythical monster: when you hack off its head, it grows two
others .1
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1 Liisa Rantalaiho, Contextualising Gender , in GENDERED PRACTICES IN WORK-
ING LIFE 16, 20 (Liisa Rantalaiho & Tuula Heiskanen eds., 1997).
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I
THE PERSISTENCE OF MEMORY
In Salvador Dali’s famous painting, The Persistence of Mem-ory ,2 clocks appear to melt away, a reminder of the passage of
time, the distortion of memory, and the “dynamic stasis”3 of life.
Against a stark landscape, one of the molten clocks rests on a
semi-formed, fetus-like creature.  The undeveloped creature ap-
pears more fish-like than human, except for its long, apparently
feminine, eyelashes.  This surrealist painting serves as an apt met-
aphor for the relationship of women to work.  While at least
some women have made remarkable progress at work, the vast
majority of women workers continue to lag significantly behind
their male colleagues,4 their careers as undeveloped and un-
changed by time as Dali’s watery creature.  Since 1964 when
Congress first enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,5 which
banned employment discrimination based on sex, women have
moved rapidly into management, law, medicine, and blue-collar
positions previously reserved for men;6 simultaneously, a large
2 Salvador Dali, The Persistence of Memory  (1931), The Museum of Modern Art,
New York, available at  http://moma.org/collection/depts/paint_sculpt/blowups/
paint_sculpt_ 016.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2004).  It is appropriate that Salvador
Dali’s work be used to represent the fluidity of gender.  He himself was interested in
gender.  He painted himself as a little girl when he was a young child. See MAX
GERARD,  DALI. . . DALI. . . DALI. . . 37 (1974).
3 In this article, I use the term “dynamic stasis” to convey the concept that condi-
tions of women at work change (are dynamic) and simultaneously remain the same
(static).
4 See  Judith Lorber, Using Gender to Undo Gender: A Feminist Degendering
Movement , in  1 FEMINIST THEORY 79, 79-80 (Gabriele Griffin et al. eds., 2000).
5 Title VII, in its relevant part, states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer –
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely af-
fect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
6 In 1962, 43% of women between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-four were in
the paid workforce.  That number rose to approximately 74% in 1990.  In 1990, 75%
of mothers with school-age children were in the labor force and 58% of mothers of
pre-school aged children were either in the workforce or were looking for work.
KATHLEEN GERSON, NO MAN’S LAND: MEN’S CHANGING COMMITMENTS TO FAM-
ILY AND WORK  4 (1993).
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majority of women work in segregated jobs,7 earning much lower
wages than men8 and enduring persistent sexual harassment.
Time has changed women’s opportunities at work while in
many ways not changing other things at all; limitations on the
ability of women to achieve equality stubbornly persist.9  Like
7 See  William T. Bielby & James N. Baron, Men and Women at Work: Sex Segrega-
tion and Statistical Discrimination , 91 AM. J. SOC. 759, 759, 761, 779 (1986) (noting
that job segregation is the principal source of gender differences in labor market
outcomes); see also JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER 195-213 (1994) (dem-
onstrating the extreme gender segregation in the paid U.S. workforce—60% to 70%
of men or women workers would have to change occupations to reach equality—and
how gender segregation causes the devaluation of work that women do); Naomi
Cassirer & Barbara F. Reskin, High Hopes: Organizational Position, Employment
Experiences, and Women’s and Men’s Promotion Aspirations , 27 WORK & OCCUPA-
TIONS 438, 440 (2000) (citing strong empirical support for the propositions that “seg-
regation concentrates the sexes in different and unequal jobs,” that
“[p]redominantly female jobs” have “shorter promotion ladders” than jobs occupied
mostly by men, that “women are less likely than men to advance on the job,” that
“predominately female jobs tend toward the lower tiers of organizations,” and that
“women are less likely than men to supervise others”).
8 According to the most recent census data for full-time workers during 2002, wo-
men earned 77% of wages earned by men.  Dr. Daniel H. Weinberg, U.S. Census
Bureau Press Briefing on 2002 Income and Poverty Estimates (Sept. 26, 2003), at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/income02/prs03asc.html (last visited Sept. 17,
2004); see also R. W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES 226 (1995) (noting that men still
make a median income that is 197% of women’s median income); JOAN WILLIAMS,
UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 67-68 (2000) (documenting studies on lawyers, managers, and academics
demonstrating that women are still dramatically under-represented in the upper ech-
elons of male professions; for example, in 1990, women were nearly half of the re-
cruits to prestigious law firms in New York, but men comprised 89% of the partners;
median income of men ten years out of law school is 40% higher than that of women
at the same position in their careers; in 1990, the top ranking partners in businesses
on Wall Street were 99% male; only two women were CEOs of Fortune 1000 compa-
nies by 1994; in 1990, women one year out of top business schools earned 12% less
than men who graduated with them, and this differential increased over time; in
academia, women represented only 31% of full-time faculty in higher education in
1995 and held fewer than 15% of tenured academic posts; women are tenured at a
rate of 42% and men at a rate of 72%); Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse , 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 579, 579, 597-98 (2001) (noting the existence of a “sizable pay gap
between men and women that is not likely to be eliminated in this generation,” and
suggesting that empirical research demonstrates that pay inequities are, at least in
part, the result of unconscious discriminatory processes that favor men at work,
rather than by rational markets).
9 See  David A. Cotter et al., The Glass Ceiling Effect , 80.2 SOC. FORCES 655, 669
(2001) (demonstrating through an empirical study that a “glass ceiling” does exist
for women); see also  David J. Maume, Jr., Glass Ceilings and Glass Elevators: Occu-
pational Segregation and Race and Sex Differences in Managerial Promotions , 26
WORK & OCCUPATIONS 483 (1999) (finding in an empirical study that white men in
female-dominated professions tend to get promoted out of the female-dominated
jobs much faster than white women, black women or black men); Judith Newmark,
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Dali’s undeveloped creature, many women do not fully realize
their potential or their expectations.  The relatively few women
who have succeeded in the marketplace have become symbols of
the progress of women, a progress that is illusory to many of
their peers.10  By lending a false assurance that workplaces have
abolished inequalities, these symbols powerfully impede further
progress.11
There is no question that Title VII has opened doors to women
of all colors in all walks of life, but the law has failed to accom-
plish equality for women at work.12  Explanations for this failure
range from the biological “natural” order of things13 to “wo-
Women in Theater: Add It All Up , ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 12, 2003, at C3
(noting the difficulties women have in theater); Some Things Better, Some Worse for
Working Women, Survey Finds: Hourly Wage Nearly Equals That of Men, But Not
Salary , BALT. SUN, Oct. 1, 2003, at 1D (noting that women’s hourly salaries are
approaching those of men but that women earn an average yearly salary of $36,716
to men’s $52,908); Anne Summers, Glass Ceiling Needs A Bit Of Leverage , SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Oct. 13, 2003, at 13 (arguing that private industry’s discrimina-
tion against women in Australia despite anti-discrimination laws accounts for the
low rate of women executive managers—8.8% in Australia’s top 200 companies).
10 See  Cotter, supra  note 9, at 655.  Simultaneously, some men have attempted to
enter the private realm of women, staying at home with their children while the
children’s mothers go to work.  These men find it difficult to justify their choices to
prospective employers. See  Kemba J. Dunham, Stay-at-Home Dads Fight Stigma ,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2003, at B1 (describing the skepticism and fear exhibited by
male managers and personnel directors when interviewing stay-at-home-dads).
Other men who are gay or perceived as effeminate suffer from sexual and gender-
based harassment at work.
11 For an interesting discussion of the success of white women which often results
in subordination of others, see Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis:
Mechanisms of Mutual Support Between Subordinating Systems , 71 UMKC L. REV.
251, 257 (2002) (arguing that white women compensate for their powerlessness as
women by using their privileged positions to subordinate others, reforming the sys-
tems that oppress white women).
12 See CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 226 (noting that in almost all nations in the
world, men monopolize the most prestigious posts in government and business); see
also  Kris Maher, Career Journal: Women in Medical Field Face Challenges Getting
Top Jobs , WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2003, at D6 (noting that while approximately half of
the medical school graduates are women, only about 13% of full professors at medi-
cal schools are women, and 7% of medical school deans are women and that only
16% of corporate officers at the ten biggest U.S. pharmaceutical companies are wo-
men); LORBER, supra  note 7, at 195-96 (demonstrating that even in women-domi-
nated fields, white men dominate positions of authority, e.g., while elementary
school teachers are predominantly women, principals and superintendents are
predominantly men).
13 See, e.g. , KINGSLEY R. BROWNE, BIOLOGY AT WORK: RETHINKING SEXUAL
EQUALITY (2002); Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperament in Modern Society: A
Darwinian View of the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap , 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 971
(1995) (arguing that biology accounts for differences in temperament and behavior
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men’s choice”14 to the economic concept that women have in-
vested less in their education and have therefore reaped less in
their careers.15  These explanations, however, are incomplete and
incorrect.  While childbirth is natural, there is little biological evi-
dence to account for men’s domination at work, in politics, and
at home.16  While many women “choose” to forego careers to
spend time with their children, these “choices” are often ordered
by necessity, societal expectations, and lack of opportunities.17
that result in the glass ceiling and the gender gap in wages) [hereinafter Browne, Sex
and Temperament].
14 See  Browne, Sex and Temperament , supra  note 13, at 1086-89 (attributing the
glass ceiling and the gender gap to women’s choices resulting from their biological
differences in temperament from men, including women’s unwillingness to take
risks, and their less aggressive and competitive natures); Richard A. Epstein, Lib-
erty, Patriarchy and Feminism , 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 89, 106-11 (1999); see also
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 314 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding the
district court’s decision that, by using generalized evidence of the differences be-
tween women’s and men’s job interests in sales positions, Sears had successfully re-
butted the EEOC’s statistical evidence of men and women’s differential placement
into, and wages earned in, commissioned and non-commissioned sales jobs).
15 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 337 (4th ed. 1992).
For a rebuttal of Gary Becker’s human capital theory which presumes that women
are more qualified to do housework and that women look for jobs that require them
to expend less effort because they choose to do work for their families, see Vicki
Schultz, Life’s Work , 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1894-98 (2000); see also  Cassirer &
Reskin, supra  note 7, at 458 (demonstrating in an empirical study that women have
lower promotion aspirations than men primarily because of segregation across orga-
nizations, with women in less favorable positions for promotion than men, and be-
cause of the unequal promotion histories experienced by women).
16 See  CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 64.  At best, the “evidence” is that there is a
biological theory that supports the observed differences between women and men as
a group.  These differences describe men and boys as more competitive, aggressive,
risk-taking, and interested in status, and women and girls as more empathic, risk-
adverse, and nurturing.  The biological behavioralists argue that these differences
are consistent with the Darwinian theory that male animals protect their own ge-
netic material, seeking to reproduce by distributing their sperm widely, while female
animals, who invest considerable effort in gestation and birth of young, protect their
genetic material by nurturing their young. See  Browne, Sex and Temperament ,
supra  note 13, at 985-1003, 1026-35.  These observed differences are equally as com-
patible with a theory that gender is socially constructed or with a theory that a com-
bination of biology and social influences create differences.  Furthermore, the
“evidence” supporting the biological basis of temperament and behavior does not
permit a society that purports to believe in equality to ignore the difficulties that
women encounter in an economic environment that is male-dominated, aggressive
and competitive, controlled by men, and based on men’s “biological strengths.”
CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 64.
17 See  Schultz, supra  note 15, at 1894-98; Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Wo-
men and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title
VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument , 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1811-12,
1816, 1821-28, 1832-33 (1990); Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Do-
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-2\ORE201.txt unknown Seq: 6 18-FEB-05 8:46
364 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
While some women have “chosen” lower education levels, even
those with educations equal to those of men find it difficult to
keep up with men at work.18  Finally, while many women tolerate
sexual harassment at work, few have “chosen” the harassing con-
ditions, lower pay, and retaliation that continue to occur daily in
workplaces.19
This Article focuses on the study of “masculinities,” a body of
theoretical and empirical work by sociologists, feminist theorists,
and organization management theorists.  This work, much of
which employment law scholars have ignored,20 studies the role
of “masculinities,” which are often invisible, in creating structural
barriers to the advancement of many women and some men at
work.  Masculinities comprise both a structure that reinforces the
superiority of men over women and a series of practices associ-
ated with masculine behavior, performed by men or women, that
aid men in maintaining their superior position over women.21  In
mesticity: Care as Work, Gender as Tradition , 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1441, 1472-79
(2001) (demonstrating, through the work of Pierre Bourdieu’s “reflexive sociology,”
that the concept of women’s choice to become the marginalized caregiver is inaccu-
rate: instead, our “choice” is constrained by structures such as institutional arrange-
ments, perceptions, and identities); see also  Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (noting that
human preferences are constructed, not elicited from social situations).
18 For an account of the persistence of inequality at work and home between wo-
men and men in Finland where the women have equal educations and experience
and there exists an elaborate structure of social support for child care, see generally
GENDERED PRACTICES IN WORKING LIFE (Liisa Rantalaiho & Tuula Heiskanen eds.
2000).
19 See IRENE PADAVIC & BARBARA RESKIN, WOMEN AND MEN AT WORK 121-46,
149 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that women are paid less and suffer harassment and retali-
ation at work).  In the 2002 fiscal year, the EEOC received 25,536 charges filed
under Title VII alleging sex-based discrimination. See  EEOC Sex-Based Discrimi-
nation Statistics, available at  http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/sex.html (last modified Mar.
8, 2003).
20 Mary Becker advocates looking at masculinities research to help build a sub-
stantive feminism, but does not specifically apply masculinities theory to employ-
ment discrimination. See  Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a
Substantive Feminism , 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 24 (1999).  Joan Howarth discusses
capital punishment as an enactment of white masculinities. See  Joan W. Howarth,
Executing White Masculinities: Learning from Karla Faye Tucker , 81 OR. L. REV.
183 (2002).
21 I am aware that defining “masculinities” themselves is controversial because I
risk the possibility of employing an essentialist definition.  Furthermore, even in re-
ferring to “men” and “women” or to heterosexuals or homosexuals, I participate in
the practice scorned by some gender and masculinities theorists of reinforcing the
rigid bilateral nature of gender (male vs. female, heterosexual vs. homosexual) with-
out giving sufficient pause to the concept that gender is fluid and changeable. See
generally  Judith Lorber, Beyond the Binaries: Depolarizing the Categories of Sex,
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their less visible form, masculinities reinforce stereotypes of the
proper role and behavior of women and men at work. Some of
these practices include aggression, competitiveness, informal
networking, and regarding women as sexual objects, caregivers,
or “aggressive bitches.”
Masculinities are not merely practices by individual actors.
Rather, masculine identities and norms are associated with the
very definition of work, the identity of certain jobs as feminine
and masculine, and the value attributed to those jobs.  These
practices harm women at work, permitting powerful heterosexual
white men to define what work is, while denying that the work-
place is gendered.22  Without an understanding of masculinities
theory, the gendered structure at work is invisible to many, par-
ticularly those who benefit from it.  Even if visible, it can be dis-
missed as the natural order.
In their more blatant form, masculinities include physical and
verbal abuse of male victims who are homosexual, or otherwise
do not conform to masculine stereotypes.  The harm to gender
non-conforming men is obvious: they are pushed, prodded,
threatened, ridiculed, and even raped at work.  Harm suffered by
women as a result of the men’s treatment is less visible but also
real.  The degradation of men occurs through taunts and prac-
tices that compare the male victims to women or that ascribe
traits to the victims that are considered “feminine.”  This behav-
ior, which assigns to women or the feminine the most humiliating
characteristics, offends women’s dignity.  Moreover, by openly
abusing men who do not conform to gender stereotypes, men po-
lice the social and gender order at work, reinforcing the defini-
tion of certain jobs as masculine and, thus, closed to gender non-
conforming men and most women.23  Even the women who
Sexuality and Gender , 66 SOC. INQUIRY 143 (1996).  While I am mindful of these
flaws, I am willing to risk this criticism in order to attempt to explain to an audience
with interest in the law the basics of masculinities theory.
22 See  Patricia Yancey Martin, “Said and Done” Versus “Saying and Doing”:
Gendering Practices, Practicing Gender at Work , 17 GENDER & SOC’Y 342, 357
(2003).
23 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment , 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1776
(1998) [hereinafter Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment].  Schultz argues
in The Sanitized Workplace  that institutional structures cause unequal treatment of
women.  Vicki Shultz, The Sanitized Workplace , 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003) [herein-
after Schultz, The Sanititized Workplace].  The most salient of these structures is the
segregation of women at work along both vertical and horizontal lines.  Vertical seg-
regation occurs when women are concentrated in jobs at the lowest rungs of the
organization, typically with male supervisors.  Horizontal segregation occurs where
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adopt the masculine characteristics that are “necessary” for the
job, as defined by the hegemonic masculinity24 at work, are pun-
certain jobs are considered to be the exclusive or near-exclusive domain of men.  In
workplaces where vertical and/or horizontal segregation occur, women are more
likely to be harassed by men who often, but not always, use sexuality as the means to
harass.  In horizontally segregated workplaces, when a woman enters the previously
all-male position, men often sexually harass the woman in order to “shore up the
masculine content and image of their jobs.” Id . at 2140.  Similar behavior occurs in
all-male jobs when men who do not conform to gender norms—are viewed as effem-
inate or gay—are hired.  In vertically segregated positions, Schultz argues that un-
like the women in male-dominated jobs who are considered to be “out of place,” the
women who refuse to conform to stereotypically female behavior are often harassed.
Id . at 2066.
Schultz notes that in vertically segregated settings:
[M]ale bosses sometimes subject women to demands for sexual favors and
other non-job-related services (such as serving food and cleaning up), to
demeaning and abusive comments linked to their womanhood, and to pa-
ternalistic forms of control and authority that would not be imposed on
men.  In addition, employers often exploit women’s sexuality by making it
an instrument of managerial control or by building sexualized requirements
directly into the job.
Id . at 2141-42; see also  Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics:
Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory , 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 91, 92 (arguing that the law should recognize and remedy the structures that
cause discrimination).
24 Multiple masculinities exist.  Robert Connell defines  “hegemonic masculinity”
as the “masculinity that occupies the hegemonic position in a given pattern of gen-
der relations.” CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 76.  It is “the configuration of gender
practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legiti-
macy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant posi-
tion of men and the subordination of women.” Id . at 77.  The concept is historically
mobile, will be challenged, will ebb and flow and new hegemonic masculinity will
appear. Id .  In other words, hegemonic masculinity is the masculinity that is ac-
cepted at a particular place at a particular time. Id.
Sociologist Stephen Whitehead notes that in common everyday usage, the term
“masculine” means those characteristics pertaining to men.  Stephen Whitehead,
Disrupted Selves: Resistence and Identity Work in the Managerial Arena , 10 GENDER
& EDUC. 199, 203 (1998).  Whitehead calls it “something that men have.” Id .  But,
Whitehead notes, a study of history and societies will demonstrate that what is con-
sidered masculine varies with the times, the geography, and the society.  Because
masculinities are ever changing and not fixed, Whitehead observes that one could
argue that they really don’t exist at all.  Whitehead contends, however, that this
conclusion would be a mistake because there is “more to masculinities than this . . . .
[M]en’s power, or at the very least their potential to have power over women and
‘others’, is substantially invested and accommodated within dominant  notions and
expressions of masculinity.” Id .
Citing to other sociologists, Whitehead notes that there are three models of mas-
culinities: hegemonic, subordinated, and conservative. Id .  Hegemonic masculinities
are the predominant, most acceptable, prevailing expressions of manliness in any
given society at a given time. Id .  The hegemonic character of this behavior would
cause subordination and/or marginalization of other ways of being male—such as
being gay. Id .  This notion itself, however, may be too neat, too essentialist. Id . at
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ished because they do not comport with the stereotypes tradi-
tionally attributed to women.25  Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the abusive behavior toward gender non-con-
forming men reinforces the gendered institution of work, an in-
stitution that privileges heterosexual white men over women and
homosexual men.26  While these behaviors are very harmful to
the victims, courts have been reluctant to recognize that they oc-
cur “because of sex.”  Consequently, much of this behavior es-
capes sanction by Title VII.
Part II briefly evaluates masculinities research, focusing partic-
ularly on evidence of masculinities in the workplace.  Part III
analyzes the law of sex stereotyping as sex discrimination and
proposes pragmatic applications of masculinities theory to inter-
pret Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination in new ways.  It
interprets the U.S. Supreme Court’s stereotyping doctrine, estab-
lished in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins ,27 to permit courts to ad-
mit expert evidence of masculinities theory to determine whether
a person is subject to disparate treatment28 at work; it also argues
that masculinities will help a jury determine whether a hostile
work environment29 exists because of sex.  The Article concludes
205.  Individuals are constituted and identified through discourse which can be ei-
ther dominant or subordinate.  Masculinities, therefore, do not exist outside the so-
cial.  The power men or women exert is only because of their taking part in
dominant discourse.  This view makes “masculinities” fragile.  The power dynamics
occur in times when change might occur. Id .
25 See  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989) (finding that an
“aggressive” female employee was subject to sex stereotyping with suggestions for
charm school, a soft-hued suit, or a new shade of lipstick in her evaluation as a
candidate for partnership).
26 See  Deborah Kerfoot & David Knights, Managing Masculinity in Contempo-
rary Organizational Life: A ‘Man’agerial Project , 5 ORG. 7 (1998).  I do not suggest
that sexuality is the only basis for hierarchies among men.  Studies show that male
hierarchies also exist on a number of physical traits such as tall vs. short and hand-
some vs. ugly, class traits such as rich vs. poor, and race—minority vs. majority.
27 Price Waterhouse , 490 U.S. at 256.
28 A plaintiff proves a case of disparate treatment by demonstrating that the de-
fendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of his or her mem-
bership in a class protected by the anti-discrimination statutes (sex, race, color,
religion, national origin, disability, or age).  As used here, the term “disparate treat-
ment” signals a case in which a plaintiff is denied a workplace benefit, such as hiring
or promotion, or suffers an adverse job action, such as a discharge or demotion,
because of his or her membership in the class.  For a more nuanced description of
disparate treatment, see infra  Part III.A.
29 A plaintiff proves a hostile work environment case by demonstrating that he or
she is harassed because of membership in a protected class (sex, race, color, national
origin, religion, disability, or age).  In a hostile work environment case, the plaintiff
does not have to suffer the withholding of a benefit, such as promotion or hiring, or
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that masculinities theory can further the courts’ understanding of
the gendered nature of work as an institution.  If applied to dis-
parate treatment and sexual, sex, and gender harassment cases,30
masculinities theory will aid courts to break the dynamic stasis of
women at work by interpreting cases consistent with the spirit
and purpose of Title VII to grant all persons, whether women,
men, or in between, equal rights to compete in the marketplace.
II
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXPLANATIONS
OF MASCULINITIES
A. Gender: Invisible Yet Pervasive
Prevailing popular thought sees gender as a fixed phenomenon
deriving naturally from biological sex.31  Many believe that there
are two biological sexes, male and female,32 whose anatomical
features prescribe a person’s gender.  Persons who have the ana-
tomical features of men are “male” or “masculine,” whereas per-
sons who have the anatomical features of women are “female” or
“feminine.”  This binary view of gender focuses almost exclu-
sively on the reproductive purposes of male and female bodies,
considering males and females as complementary reproductive
opposites who join together to propagate the race.  According to
this view, gender is fixed and derivative of our biological repro-
ductive differences; it defines who we are, how we act, and what
roles we play in society.33  Sociobiologists support this view, see-
an adverse job action, such as discharge or demotion, in order to prove that a hostile
work environment exists.  If the harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiff’s work, as perceived both by the plaintiff
and a reasonable person, a hostile work environment exists, and the plaintiff has a
cause of action.  For a more nuanced discussion of hostile work environment, see
infra  Part III.C.2.
30 I use the terms “sexual, sex, or gender harassment” cases to refer to hostile
work environment cases because of the victim’s biological sex or failure to conform
to gender norms. See infra  Part III.C.2.  The means by which this harassment is
accomplished may or may not involve sexual behavior.
31 For an example of this concept in the popular press, see Andrew Sullivan, The
He Hormone , N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000, at 46 (describing the rush of masculine and
aggressive energy one gets when one is injected with testosterone).
32 Connell notes that this view is shared by a wide spectrum ranging from Chris-
tian fundamentalists, to Jungian psychoanalysts, to the men’s movement, and to
even the “essentialist” school of feminism. CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 45.
33 This traditional view prevails in the courts’ treatment of “sex” in Title VII.
Often, courts use the terms “sex” and “gender” interchangeably. See, e.g. , Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-41 (1989).  However, recently a few courts
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ing the body as a machine that produces difference between the
sexes.34  This view leads to the conclusion that gender “differ-
ences” are natural, inevitable, and static.35
Masculinities theorists disagree.36  These scholars see gender
as complicated and negotiable.  Gender is not a natural occur-
rence resulting from biology, but a socially constructed phenom-
enon.37  Gender is an institution,38 a social structure that is
reinforced by a set of practices.39  As a social structure, gender is
have recognized that there may be a difference between gender and sex. E.g .,
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that Title VII en-
compasses both sex and  gender).  Courts ordinarily do not distinguish the two.
34 See  CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 48 (discussing the work of Edward Wilson, a
well-known sociobiologist).
35 Sociologist Judith Lorber argues that society has artificially constructed binary
concepts of gender, male and female, heterosexual and homosexual.  Lorber, supra
note 21, at 144.  Lorber contends that adopting these binary concepts reinforces the
socially constructed polarity of normal and deviant groups, one dominant and one
subordinate. Id . at 145.  Lorber notes that there are many societies that recognize
more than two genders.  Some societies have a third gender called “berdaches or
hijras or zaniths” who are biologically male but who are socially women.  Some Afri-
can and American Indian societies have a gender status called “manly hearted wo-
men” who are biological females but who fill the social role as men. See LORBER,
supra  note 7, at 17.
36 See, e.g. , CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 48-65. See generally  David Collinson &
Jeff Hearn, Naming Men as Men: Implications for Work, Organization and Manage-
ment , 1 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 2 (1994); Kerfoot & Knights, supra  note 26; Lor-
ber, supra  note 21. See also  LORBER, supra  note 7, at 1 (“I see gender as an
institution that establishes patterns of expectations for individuals, orders the social
processes of everyday life, is built into the major social organizations of society, such
as the economy, ideology, the family, and politics, and is also an entity in and of
itself.”).
37 See  Kerfoot & Knights, supra  note 26, at 8; see also  Francisco Valdes, Queers,
Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and
“Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society , 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 38-72
(1995) (demonstrating that historically society, medicine, and law erroneously con-
flate sex and gender).
38 See  Patricia Yancey Martin, Presidential Address to Southern Sociological Soci-
ety, (Mar. 2003) (on file with the author).
39 See  Martin, supra  note 22, at 344 (arguing that gender is an institution and that
gender practices are an aspect of the institution); see also JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES
THAT MATTER 230-31 (1993) (speaking of gender “performativity” to convey the
notion that a person can “perform” gender; because gender springs from social con-
cepts, rather than from biological imperatives, gender “performances” are “contest-
able” or changeable); Kerfoot & Knights, supra  note 26, at 11; Candace West & Don
H. Zimmerman, Doing Gender , in  1 GENDER & SOC’Y 125, 147 (1987) (describing
gender as a “powerful ideological device, which produces, reproduces, and legiti-
mates the choices and limits that are predicated on sex category”).
In Masculinities , Connell criticizes the sociobiologists’ predetermination theory,
noting a lack of biological evidence and the existence of a great cross-cultural diver-
sity in gender, a diversity that would not exist if biology predetermined our gender.
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ever enduring but at the same time changeable.40
B. Masculinities at Work: Gender and Organizations
In organizations, gender interacts with other social structures
such as class and race to determine who is dominant and who is
subordinated, who is powerful and who is not.41  Men are united
For example, Connell notes that there are cultures where rape does not occur; in
other cultures, homosexuality is a majority practice at least at particular stages in
life. CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 48.
Connell conceives of gender as an ordering of social practice based on reproduc-
tive capacity or processes of reproduction rather than on biology.  This ordering
includes sexual arousal, intercourse, childbirth, infant care, bodily sex difference and
similarity. Id . at 71.  The categories of male and female count only because society
has decided they do.  Connell states that gender exists to fill in the gaps that biology
leaves open. See id . at 71-72.
Connell also disagrees with the social scientists who see the body merely as a
“landscape” to be drawn on by society or who see gender as merely a perspective or
a place from which one speaks. Id . at 51.  Instead, Connell argues that while our
gender is not biologically predetermined, and while gender is socially constructed,
our bodies play a material role in this construction. Id . at 52.  He argues that
humans engage in “body-reflexive practices” that form, and are formed by, struc-
tures which have historical weight and solidity. Id . at 65.  He focuses on the active,
dynamic nature of gender as a set of practices that emerge from our bodies and
social influences and at the same time create and influence other actions by other
people. Id.  Cf. BARBARA J. RISMAN, GENDER VERTIGO 22-24 (1998) (arguing that
gender is a set of behaviors and reactions, and not only behaviors; it is also embed-
ded in institutions and structures); see also  LORBER, supra  note 7, at 244-45
(describing face-to-face interactions that are “doing gender” with men “doing domi-
nance,” and women “doing deference”).
40 See RISMAN, supra  note 39, at 6-7, 28-31, 34-44 (conceptualizing gender as a
social structure).
41 See  Lorber, supra  note 21, at 143-46 (arguing that categories of male, female,
homosexual or heterosexual actually represent power rather than sex, sexuality, or
gender, and determine which group will dominate and which group will be
subordinate); see also  Collinson & Hearn, supra  note 36, at 10 (noting that a study
of masculinities should focus on the asymmetrical power relations between men and
women in employment and unpaid domestic work); Kerfoot & Knight, supra  note
26, at 8, 9-10 (“[W]hat distinguishes masculine identities is the instrumental pursuit
of the control of social relations.”).
[M]asculine power and feminine passivity reflect and reinforce identities
that sustain and magnify many of the broader social and sexual inequalities
in contemporary society.  Management is one site where this sexual ine-
quality is sustained through a dominant competitive masculinity that limits
the potential for women and some men to participate fully in organiza-
tional life.
Id . at 10. See generally STEPHANIE WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW
INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996).  Joan Williams argues, how-
ever, that  gender is not only about power; it also is constitutive of our identities.
Williams, supra  note 17, at 1470-71.
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by violence,42 dominant sexuality, and social and economic privi-
lege.43  Masculinities and femininities are aspects of gender, con-
sisting of multiple and changing gender practices that tend to
reinforce the structural soundness of gender.44
Not all men practice masculinities, and some women do.
Moreover, the occasions on which men and women practice mas-
culinities vary with the individuals.  Even though not all men
practice masculinities and those who do, do so to varying de-
grees, men’s collective power is maintained by the perpetuation
of hegemonic forms of masculinities.45  The majority of men gain
from the hegemony46 because they “benefit from the patriarchal
42 See CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 83-84.  Connell argues that men sustain their
dominance by violence through intimidation of women, verbal abuse, physical at-
tacks, rape, and murder. Id . at 83.  Moreover, he holds that men who attack think
they are justified; this justification or authorization comes from their ideology of
supremacy. Id .  They draw “gender boundaries” by exercising heterosexual violence
against gays. Id .  They also use violence to assert reactionary gender politics, such
as killings of abortion doctors. Id .  He proposes a theory of “crisis tendencies,”
which create an escalation in violence. Id . at 84.  The theory is that when men feel
that their authority is threatened, they respond with violence.  Today, he argues,
there are increasing threats to men’s supremacy, ranging from the global movement
toward emancipation of women to the growth of the number of women contributing
to production and the pressure arising from the failure of women to gain equal pay
to the growing acceptance of gay and lesbian couples in Western culture. Id.
Law professor Joan Howarth notes:
Masculinities are formed by race and class, in part by competition between
men as well as through separation from women and from “feminine” men,
or homosexuals.  These formations are urgent and unsettled, and often po-
liced and defended through violence.  Lawbreaking, victimhood, and our
responses to them perform gender, creating men and women.  Capital pun-
ishment is an important chapter in this story. . . .
The death penalty makes a statement about the power of violence and the
meaning of death.  It is an expression of public policy and political will that
attempts to make sense of violence by recreating it.
Howarth, supra  note 20, at 192, 195 (citations omitted).
43 See CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 82; Collinson & Hearn, supra  note 36, at 11.
44 Joan Howarth states:
[G]ender is neither simple nor static.  It is complex and contingent; it can
be lost. That is, some females are not seen as women just as some males are
not understood to be real men.  We cannot talk about gender without talk-
ing about race, class, age, and other qualities.  The gender-blind version of
formal gender equality, of course, sees none of those individual characteris-
tics or any others beyond biological assignment as male or female.
Howarth, supra  note 20, at 222 (citations omitted).
45 See  Collinson & Hearn, supra  note 36, at 11.
46 Collinson and Hearn note:
[T]he failure to recognize the embeddedness, flexibility and dominance of
these multiple masculinities within conventional power relations in organi-
zations is a major reason for the ineffectiveness of many equality initia-
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dividend, the advantage men in general gain from the overall
subordination of women.”47
tives.  The possibility of sabotage by men at various hierarchical levels (and
sometimes women too) in the construction of many programmes, has only
recently begun to be addressed.  Buswell and Jenkins, for example, contend
that equal opportunity programmes often become merely a vehicle for men
managers ‘to talk to other men’ and to deny that gender inequalities con-
tinue to exist.  Such programmes not only unite men, but also individualize
and divide women, particularly between ‘full-time achievers and the rest.’
Collinson & Hearn, supra  note 36, at 11 (citations omitted) (quoting C. Buswell & S.
Jenkins, Equal Opportunities Policies, Employment and Patriarchy, Paper
Presented at the Labour Process Conference (Mar. 1993)).
Collinson and Hearn argue that a study of masculinities should concern both the
discursive and the material.  While it is necessary to avoid essentialist tendencies to
categorize, “[a] phenomenological focus upon the accounts, meanings and gendered
self-identities of employees themselves is . . . an important concern in the analysis of
gender, women and men in employment.”  Collinson & Hearn, supra  note 36, at 10.
Besides this phenomenological focus, there should also be a focus on the asymmetri-
cal power relations between men and women in employment and in unpaid domestic
work.
Collinson and Hearn acknowledge that there is an unresolved tension between
analyzing the dynamics of multiplicity and diversity and the analysis of men’s struc-
tured domination.  Masculinities are not fixed.  They change according to time, cul-
ture and class.  By the same token, a study cannot ignore that men as a group are
dominant in almost all areas of working organizations. Id . at 11.
47 CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 79; see also  Collinson & Hearn, supra  note 36, at 11;
Martin, supra  note 22, at 343.  Field research by Stephen Whitehead demonstrates
that men have different needs and different ways of coping with hegemonic mascu-
linities at work.  Nonetheless, it seems that because of hegemonic masculinities men
are better able to adjust to the ultracompetitive workplace. See  Whitehead, supra
note 24, at 200.
Connell notes:
Men gain a dividend from patriarchy in terms of honour, prestige and the
right to command.  They also gain a material dividend.  In the rich capital-
ist countries, men’s average incomes are approximately double  women’s
average incomes.  (The more familiar comparisons, of wage rates for full-
time employment, greatly understate gender differences in actual incomes.)
Men are vastly more likely to control a major block of capital as chief exec-
utive of a major corporation, or as direct owner.  For instance, of 55 US
fortunes above $1 billion in 1992, only five were mainly in the hands of
women—and all but one of those as a result of inheritance from men.
CONNELL, Masculinities, supra  note 8, at 82.  On average across all countries of the
world, Connell notes, “men are ten times more likely than women to hold office as a
member of parliament.”  Moreover, time studies show that in rich countries women
and men work on average the same number of hours in a year.  The only difference
is whether the work is paid work or not. Id .; see also JENNIFER L. PIERCE, GENDER
TRIALS: EMOTIONAL LIVES IN CONTEMPORARY LAW FIRMS 175-77 (1995).
Research demonstrates that men in predominately female jobs are promoted out
of those positions much more quickly than women. See  Cassirer & Reskin, supra
note 7, at 453.  Women who work in predominately female jobs often have men as
their supervisors. Id . at 451; see  Maume, supra  note 9, at 501 (demonstrating that
working in a female-dominated occupation enhances mobility for white men.  Where
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Research on masculinities and institutions demonstrates that
“definitions of masculinity are deeply enmeshed in the history of
institutions and of economic structures.  Masculinity is not just an
idea in the head, or a personal identity.  It is . . . merged in organ-
ized social relations.”48
Sociologist Patricia Yancey Martin49 observes that workplaces
are often bureaucratic institutions that are “fundamentally con-
after twelve years, 44% of white men in a female-dominated position will have been
promoted out of the female-dominated position, only 17% of black men, 15% of
white women, and 7% of black women will have received promotions out of the
female-dominated job.)  This ability of white men to be promoted out of the female-
dominated jobs is known as the “glass escalator.” See id .
48 CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 29.  Connell supports this conclusion with numerous
examples from a number of historical texts. See id . at 29-30.
Sociologist Stephen Whitehead agrees, stating that the discourses of managerial-
ism are not gender-neutral.  He notes that “under the particular condition of gender
dynamics prevailing in most organisations, the discourses of masculinity speak not
only a gendered language, but also privilege certain bodies—usually male.”  White-
head, supra  note 24, at 205.  Whitehead also notes that the discourses of managerial-
ism convey messages of gender authority and create a potential to “signify a
particular gender validation.” Id .
Sociological research demonstrates that business organizations also mold what is
“masculine” depending on the needs of the business.  “Economic circumstance and
organizational structure enter into the making of masculinity at the most intimate
level.” CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 36.  For example, Connell notes, in factories and
hard labor, the companies exhaust the worker’s bodies.  This is not a necessary con-
dition of this type of work, he argues, but occurs because of the way in which the
workplace is managed and controlled, given the economic pressure. Id .
Practices are not isolated individual acts, but are configured, according to Connell.
When we talk of femininity or masculinity, we are talking about configurations of
gender practice. Id . at 72.  He states:
The state, for instance, is a masculine institution.  To say this is not to imply
that the personalities of top male office-holders somehow seep through and
stain the institution.  It is to say something much stronger: that state organi-
zational practices are structured in relation to the reproductive arena.  The
overwhelming majority of top office-holders are men because there is a
gender configuring of recruitment and promotion, a gender configuring of
the internal division of labour and systems of control, a gender configuring
of policymaking, practical routines, and ways of mobilizing pleasure and
consent.
Id . at 73.
49 See  Patricia Yancey Martin, ‘Mobilizing Masculinities’: Women’s Experiences of
Men at Work , 8 ORG. 587 (2001).  Martin uses feminist standpoint theory to observe
workplaces.  Feminist standpoint theory uses women’s perspectives to describe
men’s behavior at work.  This viewpoint provides the perspective of an individual
who is often in a position of less power at work. See id . at 592-93.  Martin conducted
her research by studying seventeen for-profit organizations; her research included
observation and extensive open-ended interviews of workers in operational or man-
agerial settings, taking place between 1992 and 1995. Id . at 594.  Martin excluded
from the article cases where the women believed the men intended to harm them.
See id .
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structed of gender.”50  She concludes that gender practices occur
at work not because “infected” workers bring their gendered no-
tions to the workplace, but rather because “paid work as cur-
rently conceived, organized, and practiced springs from and is
shaped by gendered conceptions.”51  These conceptions are obvi-
ous when one considers that the “so-called empty-position” in an
organization will assume the “body and life of a man, not a gen-
der-free person,”52 meaning that one automatically envisions a
man in the open position.  Martin asserts that this construction is
harmful to many women and most men.53  She observed in her
Dr. Dorothy E. Smith originally proposed feminist standpoint theory to remedy
the failure of sociology to recognize its masculinist assumptions. See DOROTHY E.
SMITH, THE EVERYDAY WORLD AS PROBLEMATIC: A FEMINIST SOCIOLOGY 85-86,
98 (1987).  Smith notes that traditionally, women at home and at work have occu-
pied the position of dealing with the material or the objectification of the abstract.
For example, women serve as homemakers, receptionists, and clerical workers; these
workers perform the material work connected with the men’s abstract work.  The
role of women, therefore, has been to mediate for men between the conceptual and
the material. See id . at 83-84.
While sociology was considered a means of organizing an abstract view of society
using a neutral viewpoint or standpoint, Smith argued, it was impossible to have a
totally neutral standpoint. See id . at 98.  She advocated a new methodology—one
that acknowledges the standpoint of the observer who actually participates in creat-
ing the reality to some extent. See id .  Feminist standpoint research would, there-
fore, acknowledge that it was written from women’s standpoint, and not attempt to
assume a position of total neutrality.  Feminist standpoint theory would be abstract
but would also include participation in actual concrete settings, making use of mate-
rial means. See id . at 85.
Judith Lorber notes that feminist standpoint theory argues that because women
produce children and are responsible for material work in the home, women are
much more connected with their bodies and the material world than men.  Even
women who are highly educated are much more responsible for housework.  Men
who are highly educated, however, concentrate on more abstract and intellectual
endeavors.  Women’s connection to the concrete world and to their emotions makes
their world view unitary and complete. See  Lorber, supra  note 4, at 80 (citing Nancy
C.M. Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specific Femi-
nist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materi-
alism , in FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY 159 (Sandra Harding ed., 1987).
50 Martin, supra  note 22, at 345.
51 Id . at 344-45.
52 Id .; see also  Dale T. Miller et al., Gender Gaps: Who Needs To Be Explained?
61 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1991) (observing that a tendency to consider
males and male traits the “norm” in all situations in which women do not
predominate may explain the persistence of stereotypes of women).
53 See  Martin, supra  note 22, at 345.  Martin recounts the research of Professors
Maier and Messerschmidt into the space shuttle Challenger  case where the male
managers refused to listen to warnings of the engineers about flawed O-rings.  This
refusal, due to a fear of losing a government contract, led to the death of seven
astronauts. See id.  (citing Mark Maier & James W. Messerschmidt, Commonalities,
Conflicts and Contradictions in Organizational Masculinities: Exploring the
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field work that “[c]oncepts that are key to organizational life
such as competence, leadership, effectiveness, excellence, ration-
ality, strength, and authority (among others) are moreover con-
flated  with the practicing of gender in ways that differentially
affect women and men.”54
Power plays a crucial role in this dynamic.  Because some posi-
tions at work have more power, persons holding those positions
can often admit or deny that gender is being practiced .55  While
women are often powerless to insist that gender plays a role in
the organizational hierarchy, the men’s denial “does not erase
the harm women experience from men’s excluding them, making
them feel out of place, or requiring them to ‘act like men.’”56  In
fact, and perhaps even more important, Martin concludes that
men’s superior power permits them to define what they do as
work , even though women would define it as “behaving like
men.”57
Women and men who wish to survive at work must adapt to
the hegemonic masculinity practiced at the workplace.  Sociolo-
gists Deborah Kerfoot and David Knights in Managing Masculin-
ity in Contemporary Organizational Life: A “Man”agerial
Project ,58 note that masculinities must be “adopted or complied
with if a person seeks to have any influence as a manager.”59  The
form of masculinity practiced in the business world is “aggres-
sively competitive, goal driven and instrumental in its pursuit of
success.”60  This predominant masculine managerial style tends
Gendered Genesis of the Challenger Disaster , 35 CANADIAN REV. OF SOC. AND AN-
THROPOLOGY 325 (1998)).
54 Martin, supra  note 22, at 345 (emphasis added).
55 See id . at 357.
56 Id .
57 See id . at 357.  Sociologist Joyce Fletcher noted the same in her field studies of
an engineering firm in the Northeastern United States.  The men talked endlessly at
meetings about problems and showed off, but were unable to solve the problems;
the women saw the behavior as “frustrated engineers having fun talking technical.”
JOYCE K. FLETCHER, DISAPPEARING ACTS: GENDER, POWER, AND RELATIONAL
PRACTICES AT WORK 90 (1999).  Fletcher noted that this behavior was characterized
by men as “work” and it reinforced the masculinist cultural norms of the institution
such as self-promotion, autonomy, and individualism. Id .
58 Kerfoot & Knights, supra  note 26.
59 Id . at 8.
60 Id . at 7.  Kerfoot and Knights define “masculine” as a socially constructed con-
sensus of what it means to be a man. Id . at 11.  They observe that what is “mascu-
line” may change over time. Id .  They note, however, that its current manifestations
include “physical presence, competitive strength and sexual prowess.” Id .  It is fre-
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to privilege men over women socially and at work.61
Social scientists who study masculinities and gender in organi-
zations recommend that masculinities be made visible,62 that a
degendering process eliminate the perceived “natural” differ-
ences between the sexes,63 that more research on masculinities
quently expressed in situations where males “bond” in a form of false intimacy such
as rivalry or rowdiness. Id .
According to Kerfoot and Knights, gender identity is “constituted through rela-
tions of power.” Id . at 12.  Masculinity is not fixed; it is fluid, contingent, and shift-
ing throughout an individual’s life.  The authors note that once we recognize
masculinity as a fluid, unfixed phenomenon, we can explore gender identity in a
more sophisticated manner which eschews the simple dualism of masculine and fem-
inine. See id .  With this understanding, Kerfoot and Knights examine the cultural,
predominant masculinity that is privileged in everyday life and its connection with
managerial work.  Not only men, but also women in organizations often attempt to
mimic these masculine behaviors in order to gain credibility and to succeed at work.
61 See id . at 14; see also  Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet , 15 BERKE-
LEY WOMEN’S L.J. 76, 79-84 (2000) (arguing that men should adopt a male feminism
that acknowledges the various axes of privilege men enjoy, and urging a redefinition
of discrimination with this privilege in mind); Martin, supra  note 22, at 357. See
generally WILDMAN, supra  note 41.  The masculinities research contradicts the as-
sumptions made by traditional economic theory.  According to economic theory,
persons will act to enhance their own wealth; therefore, discrimination is not a ra-
tional response to the presence of women and persons of color in the workplace who
enhance the firm’s value. See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DIS-
CRIMINATION (1971). But see  RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 61-69 (1992) (arguing that dis-
criminating at work will likely produce greater efficiency).
Law and economics professor Richard McAdams has another conclusion.  Rich-
ard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Protec-
tion on Race Discrimination , 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995).  In the context of race
discrimination McAdams has argued that employment discrimination is rational. Id .
at 1008.  He notes that a group will cooperate to the economic detriment of another
group in order to raise the status of the first group. Id . at 1083-84.  This cooperation
breeds conflict with other groups, emphasizing racial differences and supporting
greater exclusivity and greater success of the dominant group. Id .  Discriminating
against a particular group of persons enhances or benefits the discriminating group
by reinforcing its superior status. Id .  Law professor Vicki Schultz, in Reconceptual-
izing Sexual Harassment , raises a similar possibility in the area of sex discrimination.
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment , supra  note 23, at 1759.  Men may
treat women differently in order to enhance their own status and the status of the
job itself. Id .
62 Masculinities theorists conclude that masculinities are pervasive yet invisible at
work because often a masculinist managerial atmosphere is perceived as “neutral.”
Before improving the work atmosphere concerning the prevalence of masculinities
at work, the existence of a gendered environment at work and rewards for masculine
behavior must be revealed, studied, and discussed. See, e.g. , CONNELL, supra  note 8;
LORBER, supra  note 7.
63 Engaging in a degendering process is closely linked to the concept of making
masculinities visible.  The paradox is that feminists need to make gender visible
while simultaneously articulating the possibilities of a non-gendered social order.
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take place,64 and that business students and managers receive ed-
ucation concerning masculinities.65  In this Article, I propose an-
other solution: that employment discrimination law redefine sex
discrimination by incorporating masculinities theory and field
research.
While there are many opportunities to use the social science
research on “masculinities” to interpret employment discrimina-
tion law, in Part III I propose the use of masculinities research to
focus on the gendered differential treatment women and men re-
See  Lorber, supra  note 4, at 81.  A number of sociologists argue that one reason
hegemonic masculinities continue to thrive is the overemphasis of the differences
between men and women. See, e.g. , CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 231-34; LORBER,
supra  note 7, at 294-302; Lorber, supra  note 4, at 83; RISMAN, supra  note 39, at 157-
62 (arguing that gender should be irrelevant to all aspects of our lives.)
Judith Lorber argues that the long-term goal should be to erase gender altogether.
She calls it the “feminist degendering movement.” See  Lorber, supra  note 4, at 80.
Lorber argues that like racial segregation, gender segregation has no moral place in
society.  Lorber argues that feminists need to abolish the gender lines, challenging
the notion that it is legitimate to make gender-based divisions in the first place. Id .
A field study by sociologist Tony Blackshaw reinforces this position at least when it
comes to lower middle-class workers. See TONY BLACKSHAW, LEISURE LIFE: MYTH,
MASCULINITY AND MODERNITY 72-73 (2003) (describing his study of the leisure
practices of “lads” in the city of Leeds in England).  Blackshaw notes that it is im-
portant to the lads to maintain their sense of difference from women. Id.  at 73.
Lads contruct their masculine identities by differentiating themselves from women
and showing that they do not aspire to having feminine identities. Id .
Robert Connell, like Judith Lorber, believes that the exaggerated difference be-
tween the sexes causes inequalities between males and females. CONNELL, supra
note 8, at 230.  Connell argues that those who defend patriarchy know that they can
defend injustice by appealing to the difference between masculine and feminine,
defining separate spheres and places for men’s and women’s bodies.  Bodily differ-
ence becomes a social reality through practices, and social organization constitutes
difference as dominance.  Difference and dominance mean not only separation but
also “intimate supremacy,” realized violently through domestic violence and rape.
Id.  at 231-32.  Like Lorber, Connell concludes that a degendering strategy is neces-
sary to dismantle hegemonic masculinity.  Without this strategy, it will be impossible
to have degendered, rights-based politics of social justice. Id.  at 232; see also  David
B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender , 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1036-37 (2002) (argu-
ing a constitutional right to be free of differential government treatment because of
sex or gender).
64 While there has been substantial theoretical research on masculinities, there is
less empirical research on the subject.
65 See  Amanda Sinclair, Teaching Managers About Masculinities: Are You Kid-
ding? , 31 MGMT. LEARNING 83, 83-84 (2000).  Sinclair notes that in business schools
there is pressure to cabin the discussion of gender, focusing on women’s issues and
diversity and avoiding the study of masculinities.  This accepted approach, Sinclair
contends, focuses on white women or members of minority groups as the “other.”
Id .  It engenders discussions blaming women for not “fitting into” organizational
culture, ignoring the masculine environment in organizations that can create signifi-
cant difficulties for most women and some men. See id .
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ceive at work and to determine two questions arising in sexual
harassment law: whether harassment is sufficiently “severe or
pervasive” to create a hostile work environment, and whether
the harassment occurs “because of sex.”
III
EMPLOYING “MASCULINITIES” TO PROVE
SEX DISCRIMINATION
A. Disparate Treatment And Harassment Creating Hostile
Work Environments
In order to accommodate changing times, employment dis-
crimination law has developed a number of theories of discrimi-
nation as well as various methods of proof.66  The two dominant
theories of discrimination are disparate treatment and disparate
impact.  Disparate treatment requires a showing of the defen-
dant’s discriminatory motive in making an adverse employment
action;67 disparate impact, a separate theory that I do not address
in this Article, occurs when an employer’s policy or practice cre-
ates a disparate impact on members of a protected class, and the
employer cannot prove that the practice or policy is job-related
and consistent with business necessity.68
Under disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff proves her case
by demonstrating that she received differential treatment at work
because of her protected characteristic, which, under Title VII,
includes sex, race, color, national origin, and religion.69  For ex-
ample, a woman who applies for a position as an airline pilot who
is refused a job because the company does not hire women pilots
is obviously treated differently, and adversely, when compared
with a man who has the same qualifications for the job and is
hired as a pilot.  If the man gets the job and the woman does not,
the woman has a cause of action using the disparate treatment
theory of discrimination.
Even if the airline does not openly discriminate against women
66 For a description of the methods of proving intentional discrimination, see Ann
C. McGinley, ¡Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII , 9
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 446-65 (2000).
67 Id.  at 446-48.
68 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000).
69 See  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  For a description
of disparate treatment, see generally Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the
Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA
Cases , 34 B.C. L. REV. 203 (1993).
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because of their sex, a woman may successfully sue the airline if
the airline applies more exacting standards to her application,
hires her but pays her less than similarly qualified men, or pro-
motes similarly situated men but does not promote her.  In Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States , Justice
Stewart explained:
“Disparate treatment” . . . is the most easily understood type
of discrimination.  The employer simply treats some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.  Proof of discriminatory motive is criti-
cal, although it can in some situations be inferred from the
mere fact of differences in treatment.70
A number of ways of proving disparate treatment have
evolved.  Where the employer directly admits that it is using a
protected characteristic to make an employment decision that is
adverse to the plaintiff, the plaintiff may prove the employer’s
illegal discriminatory intent by direct evidence.71  Where, how-
ever, the employer does not admit that it is using a protected
characteristic to make a decision, the plaintiff may prove the em-
ployer’s motive by circumstantial evidence, including anecdotal
evidence of the treatment of other members of the plaintiff’s
class, statistics concerning the differential treatment of the mem-
bers of the protected class, the employer’s failure to adhere to its
own policies, derogatory comments about members of the pro-
tected class as workers, and/or comparisons to treatment of per-
sons who are not members of the protected class.72
Harassment based on a protected characteristic that causes a
hostile work environment for the plaintiff is a subtype of dispa-
rate treatment; like other cases of disparate treatment, the plain-
tiff who alleges illegal harassment must prove that her
differential treatment is caused by her membership in the pro-
tected group.73  Unlike other cases of disparate treatment, how-
ever, in a harassment case the plaintiff does not necessarily prove
that she suffered an adverse job action such as failure to hire or
to promote, discharge or demotion.74  Rather, the victim of har-
assment can prevail if she proves that the harassment itself was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions
70 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
71 See  McGinley, supra  note 69, at 213-14.
72 See  McGinley, supra  note 66, at 451.
73 See  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
74 See id .
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of her employment.75  Once the harassment rises to this level of
severity, it creates a hostile work environment and is actiona-
ble.76  While harassment is a type of disparate treatment, this Ar-
ticle distinguishes harassment creating a hostile work
environment from the ordinary disparate treatment case where
an employer makes an adverse employment decision because of
the employee’s membership in a protected class.  I make this dis-
tinction because harassment cases are proved in ways that are
different from other disparate treatment cases.  Nonetheless, this
Article demonstrates that masculinities play a role in both tradi-
tional disparate treatment and in hostile work environment
cases.  In the former, masculinities affect employer decision-mak-
ing and lead to differential treatment of employees that is based
on the employee’s sex or gender.  In the latter, the masculinities
themselves, either alone or combined, create severe or pervasive
harassment that alters the terms and conditions of the em-
ployee’s work, creating an illegal hostile work environment be-
cause of sex or gender.
B. Predominant Masculinities At Work: Reinforcing
Dynamic Stasis
David Collinson and Jeff Hearn examine five masculinities
they have observed in the workplace: authoritarianism, paternal-
ism, entrepreneurialism, informalism, and careerism.77  Authori-
tarianism is characterized by an intolerance of dissent or
difference, an unwillingness to engage in dialogue, and a prefer-
ence for coercive power, control, and obedience.78  Managers en-
act paternalism, a masculine method of control similar to that of
the father in the traditional family, by emphasizing personal trust
75 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2347 (2004); Harris , 510 U.S. at 21.
76 See Harris , 510 U.S. at 21.
77 Collison & Hearn, supra  note 36, at 13-16.
78 Collinson and Hearn state:
Based upon bullying and the creation of fear in subordinates, authoritari-
anism celebrates a brutal and aggressive masculinity; a criterion by which
self and others are judged.  It is therefore a primary source of identification
with and differentiation from others.  Hostility is aimed at those who fail to
comply with this aggressive masculinity, for example, women, and men as
individuals or in groups that possess little institutional power and status
[e.g. black people].  In dismissing these groups as ‘weak’, those who invest
in authoritarianism try to differentiate and elevate their own masculine
identity and power.
Id . at 13.
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and loyalty.79  The effect is to ensure the subordinate’s coopera-
tion and to enhance the manager’s power.80  Entrepreneurialism
is a highly competitive managing style that elevates efficiency
and managerial control over other values.81  It requires subordi-
nates to work long hours, be mobile geographically, and to meet
tight deadlines, a schedule that eliminates many women and
some men who have family responsibilities.82  Many men use in-
79 Id .
80 Id .
81 Id . at 14.  Sociologist Stephen Whitehead observes entrepreneurialism in his
fieldwork studying further education in England and Wales.  Whitehead, supra  note
24, at 206-07 (describing the change in British further education from a model of
intellectual pursuit to a model of competitive entrepreneurialism and observing the
effects on male managers); see also  Deborah Kerfoot & Stephen Whitehead, ‘Boys
Own’ Stuff: Masculinity and the Management of Further Education , THE SOC. REV.
436, 443 (1998) (describing the entrepreneurialism present in further education: a
highly aggressive and competitive culture).
82 Collinson & Hearn, supra  note 36, at 14.  It also disadvantages families; in a
workplace that values entrepreneurialism, it is taboo to talk of pregnancy and chil-
dren and other domestic commitments.  Using the example of certain sales forces to
illustrate entrepreneurialism, Collinson and Hearn state: “[R]esearch suggests that a
deep-seated antagonism to women’s conventional domestic commitments frequently
pervades this organizational function.  Only those women who can comply with the
male model of breadwinner employment patterns are likely to be acceptable within
this dominant discourse.” Id .
Law professor Kathryn Abrams argues that the concept of the “ideal worker” as a
person who has no family responsibilities is deeply ingrained in the concept of mas-
culinity.  Kathryn Abrams, Cross-Dressing in the Master’s Clothes , 109 YALE L.J.
745, 760 (2000) (book review).  She notes that there is a complicated relationship
between masculinity and provider status that is “associated with primary commit-
ment to market work.” Id .  She notes:
While men have slowly and incrementally expanded their role in childcare
over the past two or three decades, it has been far more difficult to loosen
their attachment to “primary provider” status within the family, a role that
usually calls for “ideal-worker” performance.  Sociologist Michael Kimmel,
for example, observes that some men’s widely cited willingness to give up
their jobs to spend more time with their children is “more often rhetorical
than real; few men would actually switch places with their non-working
wives if given the opportunity.”  This is partly because, within many corpo-
rate cultures, “investing more energy into the home is a form of treason”—
a view that throws the normative weight of American capitalism into the
effort to preserve the link between masculinity and provider status.  But
even where governmental and corporate cultures have become increasingly
accommodating, men may struggle with conceptions of masculinity that
have been instilled in a broad range of social settings.  Evidence of this
tendency is found in studies of paternal leaves in Norway and Sweden,
countries that have striven to facilitate men’s access to and use of paternity
leaves by means of a broad range of governmental regulations.  In these
contexts, men take less frequent and shorter leaves and engage in different
kinds and styles of parenting activities.
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formalism to build relationships based on shared interests.
Within the informal relationships, men differentiate themselves
from women and men who do not fit the gender mold.  Often the
informal mechanism will include humor, sex, cars, sports, wo-
men, and/or drinking.  Informalism can create an uncomfortable
environment for many women and gender-nonconforming
men.83  Careerism is enacted by many middle-class white men
whose upward mobility is key to their masculine identity; often
they work long hours on tight deadlines,84 and depend on their
wives’ support to make their careers work.85  Women at work
find it difficult to compete with these men because even women
with very competitive jobs are generally more responsible for
home and child care than men in equal positions.86
Id . (footnotes omitted) (quoting Michael S. Kimmel, What Do Men Want? , HARV.
BUS. REV., Nov. - Dec. 1993, at 50, 55).
83 It often excludes women who are equals, subordinates, and even superiors.
Women who are executives often complain they have to listen to endless sexual and
sports references in informal and formal settings at work.  Collinson & Hearn, supra
note 36, at 14-15.  Collinson and Hearn note that men have a tendency to feel more
at ease with other men, a characteristic called  “male homosociobility.” Id . at 15.
Judith Lorber speaks of the importance to men of “homosociality.”  This is evi-
denced by the separation of men and boys from women and girls that begins in
childhood.  Men feel more comfortable in the presence of other men. See  LORBER,
supra  note 7, at 232.
84 Collison & Hearn, supra  note 36, at 15-16.  Identities and the dignity of middle-
class white (and perhaps other) men are intertwined with their role as breadwinner.
This is extremely important to understand when considering how to reformulate the
societal expectations. See ROBERT S. WEISS, STAYING THE COURSE: THE EMO-
TIONAL AND SOCIAL LIVES OF MEN WHO DO WELL AT WORK (1990) (demonstrat-
ing through interviews with men how important men’s work is to their identity);
Williams, supra  note 17, at 1445, 1477.  It must be, in part, this identity that makes it
so difficult to achieve equality at work. Cf . Abrams, supra  note 82, at 760-61 (argu-
ing that equality for women and men can not be achieved unless we break the bond
between masculinity and provider status).
85 LORBER, supra  note 7, at 175.
86 See  Williams, supra  note 17, at 1452, 1471 (demonstrating that women still do a
large percentage of the work at home; men who participate in the child care tend to
do the “fun” or “spiritual” work while women do the menial tasks); id.  at 1462-66
(describing the different elements of “care work” that must be performed in a fam-
ily, and noting that most of it is done by women: growth work, housework and yard
work, household management, social capital development, emotion work, care for
the sick, and daycare).  Williams notes that much of this work is defined as “care,” a
definition that ignores the work involved. Id . at 1460-62.
Law professor Mary Becker makes an eloquent statement about the double bind
that mothers experience in our society and at work:
If you decide not to be a mother, some people will regard you as not a
“real” woman.  But if you do become a mother, you are likely to be seen as
essentially a mother.  This is particularly damaging in the workforce, where
being a mother is incompatible with being an ideal worker, as Joan Wil-
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When these five masculinities, either alone or taken in combi-
nation, lead to adverse employment actions against women or
benefit their male colleagues over women, they should create a
cause of action under Title VII’s disparate treatment theory.  The
observations of Collinson and Hearn, Martin, Jennifer Pierce,
and other scholars in masculinities theory can aid judges and ju-
ries in recognizing that these behaviors at work are not gender-
neutral and often cause disparate treatment between men and
women because of their sex.
For example in Gender Trials ,87 sociologist Jennifer Pierce ex-
amined the relationships of male and female paralegals and law-
yers in a large law firm and in the legal office of a large
liams so aptly terms it.  But this is only the tip of the iceberg with respect to
disincentives to mother.  Mothers earn less money than other workers,
even after considering the fact that mothers work fewer hours because of
the demands placed on them by caretaking.  And the depression in
mothers’ wages is life long; it does not end when childhood ends.
Mothers who work for wages work more hours than other workers when
caretaking is included.  Mothers have less power in marriages than women
who are not mothers.  Working mothers of young children are often sleep-
deprived as well as leisure-deprived.  Mothers who work for wages are sub-
ject to work-place rules designed for ideal workers without caretaking re-
sponsibilities.  Mothers lose jobs because of pregnancy or absences
associated with pregnancy or caretaking (such as the need to stay home
with a sick child).  Mothers who work for wages are bombarded with
messages that they are inadequate as mothers, despite mounting evidence
that children in quality daycare do as well or better than children raised by
stay-at-home mothers on every imaginable indicator of well-being.  At di-
vorce, mothers are at risk of losing custody of the children for whom they
have cared and are likely to become poor because of the inequitable distri-
bution of assets at divorce.  In general, mothers are disproportionately
poor, because being a mother depresses one’s ability to work for wages and
increases one’s needs, given their need to provide for dependent children.
Quality daycare for the children of working mothers is expensive and be-
yond the reach of mothers who are not at least solidly middle class.  Our
intensive mothering norms, which Williams describes, place impossible
pressures on working mothers, with the result that many working mothers
feel that they are doing an inadequate job as mothers and an inadequate
job as workers.
Mothers who do not work for wages are at even greater risk of poverty in
the event of divorce.  They are also more likely to be depressed.  The work
they do is not valued much in their culture; they are often seen (by them-
selves and others) as “only” moms.
Mary Becker, Caring for Children and Caretakers , 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1495, 1526-
27 (2001).
87 See JENNIFER L. PIERCE, GENDER TRIALS: EMOTIONAL LIVES IN CONTEMPO-
RARY LAW FIRMS (1995).
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corporation.88  Pierce found that male attorneys practiced in-
formalism by including male paralegals in social events and out-
ings, but excluding female paralegals.89  Due to informal
relationships developed with male attorneys, male paralegals re-
ceived better work assignments, letters of recommendation, or
affirmation; all of these benefits were less available to the female
paralegals.90  If a female plaintiff is able to demonstrate that a
male counterpart with her same job title receives a promotion or
other significant preferential treatment because of informal rela-
tionships developed with superiors, relationships denied to the
plaintiff, she should be able to prove intentional discrimination
because of her sex.
Plaintiffs bringing lawsuits alleging disparate treatment can
make similar arguments about paternalism, entrepreneurialism,
careerism and authoritarianism if they lead to differential treat-
ment of women and men at work.
C. Sex Stereotyping as Disparate Treatment
The Supreme Court first articulated the stereotyping doctrine
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.91  Ann Hopkins, a successful ac-
countant at the defendant firm, was denied partnership because
the partners perceived her to be too masculine and aggressive.92
Her mentor explained to her that she could improve her chances
of election to partnership if she would “walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry.”93  The Court explained that Title VII forbids ster-
eotyping that would place women in a double bind in a competi-
tive work environment:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond
the day when an employer could evaluate employees by as-
suming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associ-
ated with their group, for “[i]n forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treat-
ment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”  An
88 Id .; see also  Jennifer L. Pierce, Emotional Labor Among Paralegals , 561 AN-
NALS 127 (1999).
89 See PIERCE, supra  note 87, at 145-46.
90 See id . at 146.
91 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see supra  notes 25, 27 and accompanying text.
92 Price Waterhouse , 490 U.S. at 250.
93 Id . at 272 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C.
1985)).
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employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose
positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and
impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively
and out of a job if they do not.  Title VII lifts women out of
this bind.94
The Court concluded that the evidence of sex stereotyping
tainting the decision-making process in Price Waterhouse  was
sufficient to prove that sex was a motivating factor in the refusal
to promote Hopkins.95  Justice O’Connor concurred, decrying
the use of stereotyping in employment and treating it as if it were
direct evidence of conscious discriminatory intent:
It is as if Ann Hopkins were sitting in the hall outside the
room where partnership decisions were being made.  As the
partners filed in to consider her candidacy, she heard several
of them make sexist remarks in discussing her suitability for
partnership.  As the decisionmakers exited the room, she was
told  by one of those privy to the decisonmaking process that
her gender was a major reason for the rejection of her partner-
ship bid.96
Thus, under Price Waterhouse , adverse decision-making result-
ing from an employee’s failure to adhere to sex stereotypes is
discrimination because of sex.  The narrowest reading of Price
Waterhouse  would limit its holding to the discrete situation of a
woman or man whose job required the assumption of other-sex
characteristics but who was penalized for taking on those charac-
teristics—the so-called “double bind.”  In a concurring opinion in
Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products , Judge Posner opined that
“sex stereotyping” should not be regarded as a form of sex dis-
crimination but merely serves, as in Price Waterhouse , as evi-
dence of sex discrimination.97  This reading of Price Waterhouse
is exceedingly crabbed.  Even if a woman or man is not placed in
a double bind, a requirement that she or he adhere to stereotypi-
cal sex characteristics in order to avoid an adverse employment
action must be discrimination because of sex unless the defen-
dant meets its burden of proving that those sex characteristics are
94 Id . at 251 (citations omitted); see also  Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485
(7th Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment because a rea-
sonable jury could conclude that the defendant discharged the plaintiff because of
sex stereotyping where there was evidence that she was aggressive but that men who
were aggressive were not discharged).
95 490 U.S. at 255-56.
96 490 U.S. at 272-73 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
97 332 F.3d 1058, 1068 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring).
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a bona fide occupational qualification for the job in question.98
The question in Price Waterhouse  was not the double bind exper-
ienced by Ann Hopkins, but rather whether discriminating
against her because of her failure to conform to gender stereo-
types was discrimination “because of sex.”  The Supreme Court
unequivocally answered “yes” to this question.99
Masculinities research demonstrates that workplaces are struc-
tured around gender and saturated with gendered practices that
are based on stereotypes of the proper roles of men and women.
To the extent they alter the terms and conditions of a plaintiff’s
employment, these structures and practices should be actionable
under Title VII.
Limiting a woman’s career possibilities and structuring work
assignments and expectations on stereotypes of whether the job
is “female” or “male” are invidious practices that absent the
study of masculinities can be invisible, but nonetheless very
harmful to women.  Stereotyping can be redressed by Title VII in
three ways.  It can be interpreted as it was in Price Waterhouse  as
intentional discrimination that causes adverse employment ac-
tions because of sex.  Second, stereotyping can contribute to a
hostile work environment because of a person’s sex.  Finally,
stereotyping can be a “neutral employment practice” arising
from unconscious motives, and, as noted by Justice O’Connor in
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust , can be redressed as a subjec-
98 A “B.F.O.Q.” is an affirmative defense that has been interpreted very narrowly
by the courts.  Title VII provides:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire
and employ employees, . . . or for an employer, . . . on the basis of his
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000); see  Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977)
(explaining that the bona fide occupational qualification exception under Title VII is
intended to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin) (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.2(a) (2004)). But see  Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th
Cir. 1975) (finding that grooming codes that impose limits on hair length of male
employees but no similar limits on female employees did not constitute discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex); Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d
1189, 1192-93 (D. Nev. 2002) (granting summary judgment in favor of the employer
that a policy requiring female employees to wear makeup but prohibiting male em-
ployees from doing so did not constitute unlawful discrimination because of sex),
aff’d , 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004).
99 490 U.S. at 255-57.
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tive practice under the disparate impact cause of action.100  This
Article deals with both forms of intentional discrimination: tradi-
tional disparate treatment, in which an adverse employment ac-
tion occurs because of sex stereotyping, and that in which the
prevalence of masculinities at work creates a harassing environ-
ment for women or gender-nonconforming men because of their
sex, altering the terms and conditions of their employment.101
1. Masculinities Theory: Stereotypes and Disparate Treatment
a. Stereotype: Woman as “Aggressive Bitch”
Many studies note the presence of the double bind for women
who are attempting to operate in traditionally male jobs.102  Par-
ticularly where women hold positions of leadership, studies show
they are judged differently.103  Very assertive women are viewed
especially negatively for the same behavior that, if seen in men,
would be praised.104
100 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988) (plurality opinion).
101 In a subsequent article, I address whether masculinities comprise employment
practices that create a disparate impact on women at work. See  Ann C. McGinley,
Masculinities in Disparate Impact Litigation (Nov. 11, 2004) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
102 See, e.g. , VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW?: THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN
(1998) (discussing studies concerning the lack of advancement of women at work
and attributing much of the problem to “schemas” or mental constructs that attri-
bute certain characteristics to women).
103 See, e.g ., Dore Butler & Florence L. Geis, Nonverbal Affect Responses to Male
and Female Leaders: Implications for Leadership Evaluations , 58 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 48, 54-55 (1990); see also VALIAN, supra  note 102, at 131; Martha
Foschi et al., Gender and Double Standards in Assessment of Job Applicants , 57 SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 326, 337 (1994) (applying “expectation states theory” to show that
male group members evaluate women more harshly than equally competent men
and concluding that this theory permits men to maintain the status quo); Madeline
E. Heilman et al., Has Anything Changed?  Current Characterizations of Men, Wo-
men, and Managers , 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 935, 939 (1989) (studies demonstrating
that male managers rated men as having more of the characteristics of successful
managers than women).
104 Alice H. Eagly et al., Gender and the Evaluation of Leaders: A Meta-Analysis ,
111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 16-18 (1992); see also FLETCHER, supra  note 57, at 108 (ex-
plaining that female engineers believed that if they acted in a “masculine” fashion—
confrontationally—the men would hold it against them).  Female engineers in
Fletcher’s study were expected to act relationally—to be feminine and good listen-
ers.  Ironically, however, the men devalued the women for acting in a relational
style. Id .; see  LORBER, supra  note 7, at 244.  Cecilia Ridgeway attributes this reac-
tion to women leaders as a result of “status beliefs.”  Status beliefs are shared cul-
tural beliefs about the competence of one group vı´s-a-vı´s another.  Assumptions
about the ranking of one group over another are legitimated by presumptions of
differences in competencies among people in different groups.  She notes:
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In Price Waterhouse , Ann Hopkins was considered too aggres-
sive, abrasive, and lacking in interpersonal skills.105  The Court
noted “that some of the partners reacted negatively to Hopkins’
personality because she was a woman.”106  For example, one
partner described her as “macho” while another stated that she
“overcompensated for being a woman.”107  Another partner told
Hopkins to take a charm school course; others criticized her use
of profanity.108  Still another said that the male partners disliked
Hopkins’ use of profanity only because she was a woman.109
While Hopkins’ mentor advised her to walk, talk, and dress in a
more feminine style, another partner noted that Hopkins, who
used to be a “somewhat masculine” and “tough-talking” man-
ager had matured into a “much more appealing lady [partner]
candidate.”110  Susan Fiske, a well-known social psychologist, tes-
tified that because Hopkins was the only woman and the evalua-
tions were subjective, it was likely that the sharp, critical
remarks—even those that were gender-neutral—were most
likely influenced by sex stereotyping.111
Like Ann Hopkins, the female lawyers in Pierce’s Gender Tri-
als  study suffered because of sex stereotyping.112  Female liti-
gators in an aggressive profession were criticized for not being
tough enough to do the job.113  In contrast, aggressive women
When gender status beliefs are effectively salient in a situation, as they are
in mixed-sex and gender-relevant contexts, they create implicit perform-
ance expectations for women compared to similar men that shape men’s
and women’s willingness to speak up and assert themselves, the attention
and evaluation their performances receive, the ability attributed to them on
the basis of their performance, the influence they achieve, and conse-
quently, the likelihood that they emerge as leaders.  When women do as-
sert themselves to exercise authority outside traditionally female domains,
as they must do to be high-status leaders in our society, gender status be-
liefs create legitimacy reactions that impose negative sanctions on them for
violating the expected status order and reduce their ability to gain compli-
ance with [their objectives.]
Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Gender, Status, and Leadership , 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 637, 652
(2001).
105 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1989).
106 Id.  at 235.
107 Id .
108 Id .
109 Id .
110 Id .
111 Id.  at 235-36.
112 See generally PIERCE, supra  note 47.
113 See id.  at 113-14.
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litigators were labeled “shrill” or “unladylike.”114  These women
were expected to behave in a manner that conforms to concepts
of feminine behavior while simultaneously performing the job
well: a job that, as it is configured, requires the exercising of mas-
culinities.  Kerfoot and Knights observe that women at work who
adopt competitive masculinities in order to achieve success as
managers suffer a number of other tensions at work, “not the
least of which is the conscious management and denial of the ex-
pression of their own sexuality and its consequences for their life
experience and relations.”115
As the Court ruled in Price Waterhouse , making adverse em-
ployment decisions because a woman does not conform with ster-
eotypically female behavior or patterns of dress is discrimination
because of sex.  Masculinities theory supports this position and
further demonstrates that many women suffer by trying to live up
to the ideal of the masculinized job of aggressive, competitive
litigator or business dealer.116
b. Stereotype: Woman as Caregiver
Researchers in masculinities theory have observed that women
at work experience differential treatment based on the stereo-
type of a woman as caregiver.117  In fact, many jobs become
“feminized” because they require skills that are modeled after
the stereotypical notion of woman as mother and caregiver.  Fur-
thermore, women who do not comport to the female stereotype
as caregiver are punished.  Even when performing the same job,
men are not ordinarily required to exhibit the same amount of
caregiving.
Kerfoot and Knights recognize that expecting women to act as
114 Id .
115 Kerfoot & Knights, supra  note 26, at 10 (citing DAVID COLLISON ET AL., MAN-
AGING TO DISCRIMINATE (1990)); see also  Ridgeway, supra  note 104, at 648-49, 652
(observing that when women leaders adopt assertive, self-directed, or autocratic
styles they were judged more harshly than men who use the same styles).
116 This fact should lead to the examination of the assumptions underlying the job
of litigator and whether the criteria of aggressiveness and hyper-competitiveness are
truly related to the job in question and necessary to the business.  This examination,
however, more appropriately occurs by use of the disparate impact theory of dis-
crimination, a study I undertake in a subsequent article. See  McGinley, supra  note
101.
117 See generally PIERCE, supra  note 87; Kerfoot & Knights, supra  note 26; Mar-
tin, supra  note 22.
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caregivers offers “comfort” to many men and few women.118
Masculinity derives in large part from an “identity that generates
and sustains feminine dependence and, along with it, support for
a masculine self that is continuously feeling threatened and vul-
nerable as a consequence of the failure, potential or otherwise, to
maintain control.”119  The authors note that the masculinity that
predominates in managing tends to displace intimacy, rewarding
the emotionless, rational manager.  This suppression of intimacy,
however, does not replace emotion.  Instead, it leads to a build-
up of emotions that are often expressed at work in a more “viru-
lent and violent” form, such as anger and rage.120
When this emotion is expressed, the masculine manager ap-
peals to the dependent feminine “carers” who are expected to
soothe, comfort, and empathize in order to “restore emotional
stability to a masculinity that is damaged by this deviation from
rational control.”121  These “carers” are often subordinates such
as secretaries, assistants, clerical workers, and other support staff.
Their role is to assess the mood swings of the manager and to act
as buffers or gatekeepers between the manager and others,
smoothing relationships and relieving stress.122  This role of a
subordinate as a “soother” who mediates conflicts and protects
the manager from stress caused by others, answering telephones,
taking messages, and rescheduling meetings, is a job for a person
who is passive and willingly sacrifices his or her own emotional
needs in order to further those of the manager and of the organi-
zation.  Kerfoot and Knights observe that this role is the model
of what is the “ideal feminine womanhood.”  While not all wo-
men act in this passive way, Kerfoot and Knights observe that
passivity pervades the expectations of women and silences wo-
men’s authority.123
They note that women in organizational and social settings
often attempt to realize the ideal of womanly feminine passivity.
This ideal denies the value of a woman’s self and autonomy and
defines meaning through care of others.124  While many women
118 See  Kerfoot & Knights, supra  note 26, at 8-9.
119 Id .
120 Id . at 9.
121 Id .
122 Id .
123 See id . at 10.
124 Id . at 14.  Kerfoot and Knights assert:
This subordination of self to another is part of what it is to achieve socially
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may desire to take greater control at work and a role in the hier-
archy of decision making:
[T]his feminine passivity and some less assertive masculinities
find no language with which to express such demands.  Mean-
while the hyperactivity of competitive masculinity has the ef-
fect of maintaining a tight control over organizational life but
can be so unreflective as to be unaware of what is absent and
more particularly, what is “missing” in relationships.125
In Gender Trials , Pierce observed that male lawyers expect fe-
male paralegals to listen to them complain about their cases,
soothe their tempers, and smooth their ruffled feathers.126  Fe-
male paralegals are expected to absorb the male lawyers’ aggres-
sive behavior and criticism without complaining.127  If the female
paralegals fail at this mission, they are sanctioned.128
The emotional labor required of the female paralegals includes
deference to the attorneys’ expertise, and caretaking.129  Neither
deference nor caretaking is reciprocal.  Emotional labor, similar
to the work a wife traditionally performs for her husband, creates
stress in the individual paralegal.  She must manage her feelings
of frustration and resentment at being treated as stupid, even
though she may know more than the beginning lawyer for whom
she works.130  While busy attorneys can be interrupted only as
they choose, lawyers frequently interrupt female paralegals, caus-
ing stress concerning the paralegal’s time management.131  The
paralegal is “invisible.”132  Attorneys regularly ignore their pres-
accepted womanhood, in turn bound up in an idealized form of femininity.
Part of the ‘bargain’ for many women, then, is to become the social chame-
leon, to disappear from view, to never seem ‘pushy’ or occupy social space.
Both in employment and in mixed-sex social encounters, many women
often merge into the background or simply provide a sounding board of
support through which male partners or bosses are able to express a mascu-
line assertiveness.  Femininity, then, is an ideal that in reinforcing a sense
of responding to the demands of others leaves no space for an active and
autonomous subject who can place equal demands upon those whose la-
bour and identity are serviced by contemporary heterosexual
arrangements.
Id .
125 Id . at 10.
126 PIERCE, supra  note 47, at 86-102.
127 Id .
128 Id . at 88, 92.
129 Id . at 86-102.
130 Id . at 94-95.
131 Id . at 95-96.
132 Id . at 96-98.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-2\ORE201.txt unknown Seq: 34 18-FEB-05 8:46
392 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
ence when they do not need them to do work for them, an atti-
tude that is noted and resented by the paralegals.133
Pierce notes that paralegals’ job evaluations depend in large
part on their demeanor and ability to treat others pleasantly even
in very stressful situations.134  Besides alleviating the anxieties of
attorneys, witnesses and clients, the paralegal must express grati-
tude for the attorney to others and act as the interpreter of the
moods and feelings of the attorney.135
Male paralegals received different and better treatment.  Male
paralegals had more responsibility.136  They were often mistaken
by outsiders and clients for attorneys.137  They had greater access
to power and authority than the female paralegals, and were pre-
sumed to be on their way to law school.138  Female paralegals, in
contrast, were mistaken for secretaries, and in some instances,
were asked to type documents for the attorneys.139  While male
paralegals performed emotional labor, it was of a different sort
from that expected of the women.  Instead of expecting the male
paralegals to soothe them, the attorneys engaged the male
paralegals as political advisors or to provide the male attorneys
with gossip or political information.140
133 Id . at 91-98.
134 See id .
135 Id . at 98-99.  Dr. Pierce concludes:
Paralegals are expected to utilize certain feminized components of emo-
tional labor: deference and caretaking.  These emotional requirements re-
flect the traditional female roles of wife and mother.  Much like the
traditional wife in relation to her husband, the paralegal defers to the attor-
ney’s authority and affirms his status by submitting to and smoothing over
his angry outbursts, being non-critical vı´s-a-vı´s his written work and profes-
sional habits, submitting to constant interruptions, and being treated as if
she were invisible.  And like the “perfect mother” who tends to the needs
of the family while suppressing her own, the legal assistant is expected to
be pleasant, cheerful, and reassuring, to express gratitude to others for her
boss, and to serve as an arbiter of his feelings to others.  While many peo-
ple of both sexes may harbor a “fantasy of the perfect mother,” what is
distinctive here is that the fantasy itself is embedded in the culture of work-
ing relations within law firms.  It is male litigators who can expect to re-
ceive nurturing and support from women paralegals and not the reverse.
Id . at 102; see also MARY F. ROGERS & C.D. GARRETT, WHO’S AFRAID OF WO-
MEN’S STUDIES?: FEMINISMS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 26 (2002) (noting that women are
expected to be “nice” and often live in “circumstances that inhibit expressions of
anger”).
136 PIERCE, supra  note 47, at 98-99.
137 Id . at 145.
138 Id .
139 Id .
140 Id . at 147.
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Even women in high-powered jobs are expected to perform
emotional labor for their male counterparts.  In Mobilizing Mas-
culinities: Women’s Experiences of Men at Work , Patricia Yancey
Martin describes Sara, the only woman working with approxi-
mately one hundred men.141  Although Sara is not the
subordinate of her male colleagues, they expect her to perform
the emotional roles of mother and sounding board.142  The men
talk to her about their wives, children, families and personal
lives, asking for her sympathy and explanations as to their wives’
behavior.143  This counseling costs Sara extensive work time.144
Even though Sara graduated with a PhD from an elite university
and does cutting-edge patent work, the men’s treatment of her as
a woman rather than a true scientist diminishes Sara’s self-
esteem.145
Martin and Pierce’s observations of male-female interactions
in organizations support the theory posited by Kerfoot and
Knights.146  Pierce’s research establishes the masculinization and
feminization of traditional jobs in the workplace.  The jobs of at-
torneys, especially those of litigators, were characterized by mas-
culine ideals and behavior identified by Kerfoot and Knights as
aggression, competitiveness and repression of emotion, leading
to outbursts of anger; meanwhile, the jobs of their subordinates,
the paralegals, were feminized.  As traditional wives and
mothers, female paralegals deferred to and took care of their
male attorneys.  The structure of the relationship at work, there-
fore, reflected the socially accepted structure of the roles of men
and women.  Even more notable is that the men working in the
feminized paralegal jobs were able to transcend their job titles.
Unlike the women, the men were not expected to act as
caregivers to the extent the women were.  Moreover, they
benefitted from the hegemonic masculinity by being mistaken for
lawyers and being invited to informal gatherings with the
lawyers.
Judging women’s job performance more harshly than men’s
because of the women’s failure to act in the stereotypically fe-
male manner is differential treatment because of her sex.  To the
141 Martin, supra  note 49, at 599.
142 Id .
143 Id .
144 Id .
145 See id .
146 See PIERCE, supra  note 47, at 86-89.
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extent that an employer refuses to hire, fails to promote, or fires
a woman because of her inability or unwillingness to perform
emotional labor that is not required of men in the same job, the
employer discriminates against her because of her sex.  A woman
placed in this position should be able to prove, through the use of
the McDonnell Douglas147 test, that the employer violated Title
VII.  She can prove her prima facie case by demonstrating that
she is a woman, is qualified for the position, and that she either
applied and was not hired or promoted, or was fired from the
job.  She must also prove either that men holding the same job
have fewer and different requirements of emotional labor or that
other women who were willing to perform the emotional labor
were hired, retained, or promoted.  An employer would likely
attempt to use the woman’s inability to get along with others as a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment
decision.  The plaintiff’s response, armed with expert evidence of
masculinities present at work, is that the employer’s reason is not
legitimate because it is based on sex: men in the same jobs are
not judged by the same criteria.
Even in a workplace where there are no men working in the
particular job and caregiving is required, the plaintiff should of-
fer masculinities research to demonstrate that specific job criteria
are based on sex stereotyping.  Once this premise is established,
the evaluations of one’s performance in the job are based on sex.
For example, a secretary who is penalized for failing to take care
of her boss in stereotypically feminine ways such as by bringing
him coffee, buying gifts for his wife, or soothing his anger should
offer expert evidence of masculinities theory to demonstrate that
making employment decisions based on these factors is discrimi-
nation because of sex unless the employer can prove that these
147 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  McDonnell
Douglas  was the first case that articulated the method of proving discrimination by
inference.  Under the McDonnell Douglas  construct, the plaintiff proves a prima
facie case by proving that he is a member of a protected class, has applied for a
position for which he is qualified, is rejected for the position, and the position re-
mains open or was filled by a person who is not a member of the protected class. Id .
After the plaintiff makes out the prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to
the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment decision. Id .  Once the defendant offers evidence of a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff and
merges with the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that the defen-
dant’s proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id . at 802-03; see  Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).
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criteria are bona fide occupational qualifications.148
There is no question that there are certain jobs for which care-
taking is a legitimate criterion.  For example, an employer has the
right to expect a soothing, caring personality from a kindergarten
teacher or a nurse.  In order to avoid violating Title VII, how-
ever, an employer should apply this expectation equally to wo-
men and men in the workplace.  Moreover, an employer who
refuses to hire a man as a nurse or kindergarten teacher because
of the employer’s stereotype that women are more caring and
soothing illegally discriminates against the male applicant, be-
cause the employer uses sex stereotyping to determine that the
male applicant cannot meet the expectations of the job.
c. Stereotype: Woman as Siren
A third stereotype is that of woman as dangerous temptress.
Patricia Yancey Martin’s field research produced Tom, a middle-
aged manager and a married Christian who vowed to himself for
thirty years that he would never dine alone with a woman other
than his wife.149  Tom traveled often for his job and when he ar-
rived at his destination, he would meet his host for dinner to plan
the next day’s meetings, unless the host was a woman.150  Finally,
after thirty years of this practice, Tom realized that his behavior
discriminated against the women who were his hosts because he
created an informal network with the men but did not get to
know the women as well.151  Despite this realization, Tom did not
change his policy.152  Professor Martin notes that this policy
frames women as sexual beings, as signs of sexuality, and as a
temptation to engage in sex.  When Tom became aware of the
discriminatory nature of this policy and still continued to practice
it, he was practicing gender fully aware that if he were not to do
so it might be better for his company.  Instead, the institution of
gender prevailed to determine his behavior.153
Tom’s story demonstrates that women suffer professionally
from the stereotype of woman as dangerous sex symbol.  This
stereotype, combined with the informalism that excludes women
from important relationships, creates serious barriers to women’s
148 See supra  note 98 and accompanying text.
149 Martin, supra  note 22, at 348.
150 Id .
151 Id .
152 Id .
153 See id . at 349.
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advancement at work, contributing in large part to the dynamic
stasis I identified in Part I.  Certainly, the use of sex stereotypes,
such as woman as siren, to make decisions concerning hiring,
promotion, or firing is illegal under Title VII as disparate treat-
ment because of sex.  Expert testimony from masculinities theo-
rists can help judges and juries realize that the decision a
manager makes to avoid contact with a lower-level employee be-
cause she is sexually attractive is illegal discrimination because of
sex and may perpetuate and amplify inequalities between women
and men at work.
In the above subsections, I have demonstrated that masculini-
ties research can make many unequal work relationships visible
to judges and juries trying Title VII cases.  There are times, how-
ever, when it would be difficult to prove that a plaintiff has suf-
fered an adverse employment action as a result of masculinities
because there is no comparator154 with whom a plaintiff may
compare her job progress.  These plaintiffs may be able to re-
dress the masculinities at work by alleging sex or gender harass-
ment, and demonstrating that masculinities practices create a
hostile work environment that alters the terms and conditions of
their work because of their sex.155  The next subpart explains
how masculinities theory applies to prove a cause of action under
Title VII by demonstrating that the practices employed create a
hostile work environment because of a person’s sex.
2. Masculinities Theory: Sex Stereotyping as Harassment
a. Hostile Work Environments Under Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment because of an individual’s race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin.156 The express language of the Act
does not mention harassment.157  Nonetheless, the courts began
to recognize that racial harassment created a cause of action,
154 In employment discrimination, the Court has advocated the use of “compara-
tor” evidence to prove disparate treatment.  A plaintiff can prove that she has suf-
fered intentional discrimination by demonstrating that a “similarly situated” person
who is not a member of the protected class was treated better than she. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
155 Another possibility would be to address these five practices as neutral employ-
ment practices that have a disparate impact on women.  I address this point in a
subsequent article. See  McGinley, supra  note 101.
156 See supra  note 5.
157 Id .
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based on an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environ-
ment if that environment alters the terms and conditions of the
plaintiff’s employment.  In Rogers v. Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission , the Fifth Circuit held that a Latino plaintiff
established a violation of Title VII by demonstrating that the em-
ployer’s mistreatment of its Latino customers created a hostile
work environment for its Latino workers.158  Lower courts subse-
quently found illegal harassment based on a plaintiff’s race, relig-
ion, and national origin.159  Following the lower courts, the
EEOC issued guidelines in 1980 for Title VII liability in sexual
harassment cases.160  The guidelines distinguished between har-
assment that is directly linked to an economic quid pro quo and
harassment that alters the terms and conditions of employment
because it creates an abusive environment based on a person’s
sex.  In either case, the guidelines stated, the conduct constitutes
actionable sexual harassment under Title VII if it “has the pur-
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offen-
sive working environment.”161  After the guidelines were issued,
lower courts uniformly held that a cause of action existed under
Title VII for a hostile work environment based on sexual
harassment.162
In 1986, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB  v. Vinson , the Supreme
Court confirmed that sexual harassment creating a hostile work
environment sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a person’s
work environment constitutes sex discrimination under Title
VII.163  The plaintiff in Meritor  presented evidence that her su-
158 454 F.2d 234, 240 (5th Cir. 1971).
159 See, e.g. , Carino v. Univ. of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir.
1984) (finding illegal discrimination on the basis of the employee’s national origin);
Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 620 F.2d 655, 661 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding ille-
gal discrimination on the basis of the employee’s race); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.,
516 F.2d 544, 551 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding illegal discrimination on the basis of the
employee’s religion); see also  Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 657 (6th Cir.
1999) (stating that Title VII provides a cause of action for racial harassment in the
workplace); Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 463 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that
workplace harassment may take the form of racial discrimination); Daniels v. Essex
Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1991) (recognizing a Title VII claim on the
basis of racial harassment).
160 Discrimination Because of Sex Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (Nov. 10, 1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2004)).
161 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3).
162 See, e.g. ,  Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
163 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986).
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pervisor had subjected her to repeated demands for sexual fa-
vors, fondling, and forcible rape.164  The defendant argued that
Title VII was limited to redressing discrimination resulting in a
tangible economic loss, not merely psychological injury.165  Be-
cause the plaintiff had not suffered an economic loss, the defen-
dant argued, she had not suffered actionable sex
discrimination.166  The Court rejected this view, relying on the
language of the statute, the 1980 EEOC Guidelines, and lower
court cases holding that abusive working environments can con-
stitute sex discrimination.167  Adopting the reasoning of the
EEOC Guidelines, the Court held that the language of the stat-
ute making it illegal to discriminate in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment protects workers from abusive working
environments based on sex as well as race and national origin.168
Sexual harassment is actionable if it is “sufficiently severe or per-
vasive ‘to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and
create an abusive working environment.’”169
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. , the Court held that a plain-
tiff need not demonstrate severe psychological damage to state a
cause of action for a hostile work environment.170  Rather, a
plaintiff proves a violation of Title VII when she shows that the
harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive by objective171 and
164 Id.  at 60.
165 Id . at 64.
166 Id .
167 Id . at 63-66.
168 Id.
169 See id.  at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1982)).
170 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
171 There is a split among the circuits concerning whether the objective standard is
the “reasonable woman” standard or the “reasonable person” standard.  In Ellison
v. Brady , 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit adopted the “reasonable
woman” standard, noting that use of a “reasonable person” standard might reinforce
the “prevailing level of discrimination.” Id . at 878.  The court preferred to analyze
whether a work environment is hostile from a victim’s perspective, a view that would
require an analysis of the different perspectives of men and women. Id.; see also
Gray v. Genlyte Group, Inc., 289 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying the “reasonable
woman” standard in a case applying Massachusetts law).  Other courts refused to
adopt the “reasonable woman” standard, noting that a sex-based standard would
reinforce stereotypes about women. See, e.g. , Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of
Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426 (2d Cir. 1999).
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue directly, in Harris  the
Court defined an objectively hostile work environment as one that “a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive.” Harris , 510 U.S. at 21.  It declined to address
the question of the validity of recently proposed EEOC regulations that specifically
adopted both a “reasonable person” standard and a “victim’s perspective” standard.
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subjective measures.172
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. , the Court held
that Title VII creates a cause of action for sexual harassment
where the harassers and the victim are of the same sex if the
environment discriminates because of sex.173  While the Court
did not elaborate, it gave three examples of evidentiary routes
for proving that same-sex harassment occurred because of sex.174
First, if there is credible evidence that the harasser is a homosex-
ual, the inference can be drawn that the harassment occurred be-
cause of the victim’s sex.175  This conclusion is based on the
concept that a homosexual would be attracted to another person
of the same sex and may make sexual advances toward him or
her.176  But the Court made clear that sexual attraction is not the
only motive for sexual harassment.177  Second, if the victim is
harassed in sex-specific and derogatory terms by another person
of the same sex, the trier of fact can reasonably infer that the
harasser is motivated by general hostility toward the presence of
Id . at 23 (citing Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender,
National Origin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (Oct. 1, 1993) (to be codi-
fied at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1609.1(c)).  The EEOC-proposed regulation, later withdrawn by
59 Fed. Reg. 51, 396 (1993), stated, “[t]he ‘reasonable person’ standard includes con-
sideration of the perspective of persons of the alleged victim’s race, color, religion,
gender, national origin, age, or disability.”  Guidelines on Harassment Based on
Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. at
51,269.
Harris  does not settle the question of whether the reasonable woman standard is
still good law.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), de-
cided after Harris , notes that “the objective severity of harassment should be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering
‘all the circumstances.’” Oncale , 523 U.S. at 81 (quoting Harris , 510 U.S. at 23).
This standard is consistent with the reasonable woman standard because it requires
the fact-finder to consider the plaintiff’s position. See Oncale , 523 U.S. at 80.  One
aspect of this position is to consider the gender of the alleged victim.  The Ninth
Circuit continues to use the reasonable woman standard. See, e.g ., Holly D. v. Cal.
Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003).  For an interesting view of the reasona-
ble woman standard, see Stephanie M. Wildman, Ending Male Privilege: Beyond the
Reasonable Woman , 98 MICH. L. REV. 1797 (2000).  Wildman argues that a reasona-
ble woman standard does not go far enough, but that it is necessary to examine the
facts from an analysis which makes male privilege visible in order to come to the
proper conclusion.
172 Harris , 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor , 477 U.S. at 67).
173 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
174 Id . at 80-81.
175 Id . at 80.
176 Id .
177 Id .
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other members of his or her own sex in the workplace.178  Third,
a victim of same-sex harassment can offer direct comparative evi-
dence of differential treatment of men and women in the
workplace.179
Since Oncale , lower courts have had difficulties determining
whether same-sex harassment occurs because of sex.  The issue is
particularly troublesome because many courts have held that
hostile work environment harassment because of sexual orienta-
tion is not covered by Title VII,  but harassment because a per-
son does not conform to gender stereotypes is covered.180  As
explained below, the cases holding that harassing a man because
he does not conform to the traditional stereotype of men as mas-
culine rely on the principle set forth in Price Waterhouse .181
b. Same-Sex Harassment Because of Sex
A plaintiff suing for sex harassment must prove that the har-
assment occurs because of sex.182  Where the harassing behavior
is sexual in nature, courts have little difficulty finding in a case of
male on female harassment that the harassment occurred be-
cause of sex, automatically drawing the inference that the man’s
sexual advances, touches, or jokes are related to the sex of the
victim.183  This inference is ordinarily drawn because courts have
178 Id .
179 Id . at 80-81.
180 See, e.g ., Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the district court improperly granted judgment to the defendant in a bench trial
where throughout plaintiff’s employment his male coworkers and a supervisor sub-
jected him to name-calling such as “her” and “she” and mocked him for carrying a
tray “like a woman”); Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the lower court improperly granted a motion to dismiss a heterosexual
male’s claim alleging that his coworkers harassed him, called him a “homo” and
“jerk off,” unbuttoned his clothing, patted him on the buttocks, asked him to per-
form sexual acts, scratched his crotch and humped his door frame, concluding that
“simply because some of the harassment alleged by Schmedding includes taunts of
being homosexual or other epithets connoting homosexuality, the complaint is [not]
thereby transformed from one alleging harassment based on sex to one alleging har-
assment based on sexual orientation”).
181 See supra  related discussion in notes 25, 27 & Part III.C.
182 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc. , 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).
183 See id.  at 80, stating that
[c]ourts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw
in most male-female sexual harassment situations because the challenged
conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it
is reasonable to assume [that] those proposals would not have been made
to someone of the same sex.
See also  Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 574 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting “it is
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generally assumed that the purpose for the sexual behavior was
to forward the romantic interests of the perpetrator.  The courts
reason that the perpetrator, presumably a heterosexual in a male
on female harassment case, would not have behaved the same
way with a person of his own sex.  While sexual attraction is not
the only reason for sexual harassment, courts have nonetheless
had greater problems concluding that same-sex harassment is be-
cause of sex, especially where there is no evidence that the har-
asser him or herself is gay or lesbian.184
Since Oncale , plaintiffs in same-sex hostile environment cases,
with varying degree of success, have used the sex stereotyping
doctrine of Price Waterhouse  to prove that their harassment was
because of sex.  Male plaintiffs compare their situation to that of
Ann Hopkins, who was denied partner status because she did not
live up to the ideals of femininity held by the partners.  Male
coworkers and supervisors have harassed male plaintiffs, they ar-
gue, because they do not live up to the traditional ideal of
masculinity.
A cabined view of Price Waterhouse  might conclude that the
stereotyping doctrine does not apply to harassment cases at
all.185  One could argue that the stereotyping doctrine applies
only where there is an adverse employment decision made be-
cause the plaintiff does not conform to societal gender norms or
stereotypes.  This interpretation of Price Waterhouse , however,
would seem particularly stingy, given that the Court has held on
numerous occasions that a hostile work environment can alter
the terms, conditions or privileges of employment just as an ad-
verse job action can.186
Furthermore, in both Price Waterhouse  and in the cases of
male-on-male sexual harassment, the key issue is whether the ad-
verse treatment occurred because of sex.  If the use of gender
stereotypes to deny a woman partnership is an adverse employ-
ment action because of her sex, the creation of a hostile work
environment because a man does not live up to gender stereo-
generally taken as a given that when a female employee is harassed in explicitly
sexual ways by a male worker or workers, she has been discriminated against ‘be-
cause of’ her sex”), vacated by  523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
184 See Doe , 119 F.3d at 575.
185 See, e.g. , Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766 (6th Cir.
Jan. 15, 1992).
186 See, e.g. , Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Faragher v. Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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types must be because of his sex.187
Many post-Oncale  courts accept that Price Waterhouse ’s stere-
otyping doctrine applies to hostile work environment harassment
cases,188 but they struggle with the question of whether the hos-
tile work environment is due to sex stereotyping which would
create a cause of action under Title VII,189 or to the alleged vic-
tim’s sexual orientation (or perceived sexual orientation), which
they hold is not covered by Title VII.190
187 Judge Richard Posner has suggested another means of distinguishing Price
Waterhouse.  In his concurrence in Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc.,  332 F.3d
1058, 1066-68 (7th Cir. 2003), Posner argued that a man in an all-male environment
has no cause of action for harassment based on sex stereotypes because the stereo-
type is not used to discriminate against men in general.  Posner opines that in Price
Waterhouse  there was a cause of action because the partnership used a gender stere-
otype to deny entry of Ann Hopkins, a woman, into a nearly all-male partnership.
In the all-male environments, however, Posner argues, there is discrimination
against a subclass of men, not discrimination against men.  As Posner states, “[t]hey
are discriminated against not because they are men, but because they are effemi-
nate.” Id . at 1067.  This analysis, however, is reminiscent of Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gil-
bert ,  429 U.S. 125  (1976), in which the Supreme Court held that discrimination
because of pregnancy was not sex discrimination. Gilbert  quickly prompted Con-
gress to overrule the decision by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.  Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (2000)).  In Gilbert , which has been much maligned for its reasoning, the
Court held that the defendant’s denial of pregnancy benefits did not violate Title VII
because it discriminated against a subclass of women—pregnant women—but not
against all women. Gilbert , 429 U.S. at 138-39, 145-46.  Under Title VII a plaintiff
does not have to prove that all members of the group are discriminated against in
order to establish a cause of action.  For a more thorough analysis of Gilbert  and the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, see Ann C. McGinley & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Conde-
scending Contradictions: Richard Posner’s Pragmatism and Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion , 46 FLA. L. REV. 193, 235-45 (1994).
188 See, e.g. , Hamm , 332 F.3d at 1064 (accepting the use of the Price Waterhouse
sex-stereotyping theory where applicable but concluding that the plaintiff’s case was
not a sex-stereotyping case as a matter of law); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231
F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming the lower court’s grant of summary judg-
ment because evidence shows that plaintiff was harassed because of his apparent
homosexuality, and not sexual stereotyping). But see  David S. Schwartz, When is
Sex Because of Sex?: The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law , 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 1697, 1742-43 (2002) (concluding that Oncale  does not stand for the pro-
position that harassment based on non-conformity to gender norms is sex
discrimination).
189 See  Nichols v. Aztec Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the plaintiff, an “effeminate man,” had a cause of action under Title VII,  using
the Price Waterhouse  sex-stereotyping theory for same-sex hostile work environ-
ment harassment where his co-workers subjected him to taunts). Cf.  Rene v. MGM
Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (concluding that
Rene, a homosexual who had endured attacks and taunts in a same-sex environ-
ment, had a cause of action under the sex-stereotyping theory of Price Waterhouse).
190 See, e.g ., Hamm , 332 F.3d at 1062 (affirming the district court’s grant of sum-
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The cases demonstrate that drawing this line is virtually impos-
sible.191  Since Oncale , the courts of appeals have dealt with the
issue in six published cases; three held that the plaintiff made out
a cause of action192 for sex stereotyping; with nearly identical
facts, three others held that the plaintiff did not.  In the latter, the
courts held that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff was harassed
because of his sexual orientation or perceived homosexuality
rather than for his failure to conform to sex stereotypes.193
mary judgment in Title VII case alleging same-sex hostile work environment be-
cause the evidence supported only work performance conflicts or harassment based
on perceived sexual orientation, not sexual stereotyping); Spearman , 231 F.3d at
1085 (affirming the lower court’s grant of summary judgment because evidence
showed that plaintiff was harassed because of his apparent homosexuality, and not
sexual stereotyping).
191 One court states that such a claim “requires us to navigate the tricky legal
waters of male-on-male sex harassment.” Hamm , 332 F.3d at 1062.
192 See Rene , 305 F.3d at 1068-69 (holding by the plurality decision reversed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant, and three judges con-
curred that Rene had preserved his case of sex stereotyping for appeal where the
plaintiff was openly gay and his coworkers had teased him about the way he walked,
whistled at him, caressed his buttocks, blew kisses at him, touched his body and his
face, and called him “mun˜eca” or doll); Nichols , 256 F.3d at 869-70, 874 (holding
that the district court improperly granted judgment in a bench trial to the defendant
where throughout plaintiff’s employment his male coworkers and a supervisor sub-
jected him to name-calling such as “her” and “she,” mocked him for carrying a tray
“like a woman,” and for not having sex with a waitress who was his friend, called
him “faggot” and “fucking female whore,” and directed “the most vulgar name-call-
ing . . . cast in female terms.”); Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th
Cir. 1999). See  summary of Schmedding  holding, supra  note 180. Cf . Doe v. City of
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding before Oncale  that the plaintiffs
had made out a cause of action for sex stereotyping where two sixteen-year-old boys
were subjected to relentless harassment, called “fat boy,” “fag,” “queer,” “bitch,”
asked “Are you a boy or a girl?”, threatened to be taken “out to the woods,” and
had their testicles grabbed), vacated by  523 U.S. 1001 (1998).  While Doe  was va-
cated by the Supreme Court in light of Oncale , Doe ’s alternative holding based on
sex stereotyping is probably still good law. See Hamm , 332 F.3d at 1063 (citing to
Doe  for its sex-stereotyping holding and distinguishing it on its facts); Bibby v. Phila.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 263 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that the
Doe  holding concerning sex stereotyping is still good law).
193 See Hamm , 332 F.3d at 1059-60 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming grant of summary
judgment to the defendant because no reasonable jury could conclude that the har-
assment plaintiff suffered was sex stereotyping rather than caused by his work per-
formance or his perceived homosexuality where coworkers regularly threatened
plaintiff in vulgar terms, called him “faggot,” “bisexual,” and “girl scout,” and
passed rumors that he was gay, warning others not to bend over in front of him);
Bibby , 260 F.3d at 260, 265 (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment
because the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence that the harassment was
because of sex where the plaintiff, a gay man, was assaulted at work, told by his
assaulter, “everybody knows you’re a faggot,” and “everybody knows you take it up
the ass,” called “sissy,” and mistreated by his supervisors); Spearman , 231 F.3d at
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These cases are indistinguishable.  They all arise in an all-male
or virtually all-male environment.  In all of the cases, co-workers
and/or supervisors use vulgar verbal taunts as well as physical
attacks, often to sexual organs of the victim, to harass him.
Moreover, the taunts invariably include comments questioning
the victim’s masculinity and his sexual orientation. Terms such as
“bitch,” “fag,” “queer,” “homo,” and “sissy,” actions such as the
grabbing of testicles, questions asking whether a person is male
or female or “takes it up the ass,” and threats of rape are com-
mon to all of the cases.  It would be impossible for the courts, the
juries or, I daresay, even the victims or the perpetrators, to dis-
tinguish between behavior that is motivated by the victim’s fail-
ure to conform to gender stereotypes and behavior motivated by
the victim’s sexual orientation.194
Many of the most blatant gender stereotypes derive directly
from the sex act.  For example, stereotypes hold that men are
aggressive, take the initiative, and are physically strong and emo-
tionally remote; women are passive, allow men to take the initia-
tive, and are physically weak and emotional.195  These
descriptions conflate with the concept of how the sex act should
be practiced between men and women.  In effect, the ultimate
stereotype about men is that they are active during sexual rela-
tions, and have sexual relations exclusively with women; the ulti-
mate stereotype about women is that they are passive and
receptive during sexual intimacies, which they perform exclu-
sively with active men.  A man who engages in sex with other
men or a woman who engages in sex with other women does not
live up to this most basic stereotype.  In fact, society defines the
gender of homosexual men as female, and of lesbian women as
male precisely because they engage in same-sex sexual activity.
Creating a hostile environment because of the biological sex of
1082-83 (affirming lower court’s grant of summary judgment and concluding that the
harassment was because of plaintiff’s perceived sexual orientation where coworkers
called plaintiff “little bitch,” “cheap ass bitch,” “[y]ou f-ing jack-off, pussy-ass,”
threatened to “f- [his] gay faggot ass up,” and wrote graffiti on the bulletin board
stating “Aids kills faggots dead . . . RuPaul, RuSpearman” (after RuPaul, a black
male drag queen)).
194 For an interesting discussion of male feminism, male and heterosexual privi-
lege, and the fear heterosexual men have of being portrayed as not heterosexual, see
Carbado, supra note 61, at 97-104, 108-11.
195 See  Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the
Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law
and Society , 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 38-44 (1995).
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the alleged victim’s sexual partners would therefore equate to
discrimination against the victim because of his or her gender
nonconformity with a sex-based stereotype.196
Professor Frank Valdes demonstrates this point in his article,
Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Confla-
tion of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-Amer-
ican Law and Society .197  Like many feminists and masculinities
theorists, Valdes distinguishes among a person’s sex, gender (or
social identity), and sexual orientation (or sexual identity).
Valdes traces the historical roots of the conflation of sex and gen-
der; he shows that early twentieth century European and Ameri-
can medical and psychological texts inextricably intertwined sex
and gender.198  He demonstrates that the prevailing concept was
(and still is) that a person’s gender will ordinarily flow from his
or her biological sex, as defined by external genitalia.199  Thus,
those with the biological characteristics of men were also ex-
pected to act socially as men: to conform to the expectations of
the active, aggressive, masculine person.200  In contrast, persons
196 In his dissent in Rene , Judge Hug attempts to distinguish Nichols . Rene , 305
F.3d at 1070-78 (Hug, J., dissenting).  While Nichols is allegedly heterosexual and
Rene is homosexual, Judge Hug does not overtly base his distinction on this differ-
ence.  Instead, he argues that Nichols was discriminated against based on his effemi-
nate behavior at work, whereas Rene was discriminated against based on his sexual
orientation. Id.  at 1077.  This distinction is amorphous, unless the courts want
openly to distinguish between heterosexuals and homosexuals.  This distinction
would deny rights to a whole class of persons: homosexuals.  Second, it would lead
to intrusions into the privacy of individuals.  Finally, some courts have already con-
cluded that a harassing environment based on “perceived homosexuality” is permis-
sible.  Thus, in these cases, even heterosexuals would suffer harassment without
recourse.
In Hamm , Judge Posner assumes that the sex stereotyping doctrine applies only to
heterosexual men—that homosexual men cannot use this doctrine to create a cause
of action.  Other courts reaching this question are in clear disagreement.  According
to these courts, the sexual orientation of the plaintiff is irrelevant in deciding
whether the discrimination is because of sex. See, e.g. , Rene , 305 F.3d at 1068 (plu-
rality opinion); Bibby , 260 F.3d at 264.  When Posner makes this argument, he im-
plicitly recognizes the impossibility of separating harassment based on sexual
orientation and harassment based on a person’s failure to conform to stereotypes.
However, he excludes from the doctrine a whole class of individuals—homosexual
men—who would otherwise be protected by the statute, just by virtue of their sexual
orientation.  This exclusion would create an incentive to prove that an employee is
homosexual or that he was perceived to be homosexual, a prospect that may lead to
perjury, discovery abuse, and further harassment.
197 Valdes, supra  note 195.
198 Id . at 34-56.
199 Id . at 38-44, 52-56.
200 Id . at 40-42, 51.
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born with the biological characteristics of women were expected
to act passively, shunning interest in work in the outside world.201
Persons whose biological sex and gender did not conform with
each other were considered diseased “inverts.”202  Valdes notes
that this conflation of sex and gender continues to dominate to-
day.  While psychologists and psychiatrists no longer use the term
“invert,” the psychiatric community continues to accept the basic
conflation of sex and gender, classifying as illness “gender iden-
tity disorder.”203
Valdes also demonstrates that as gender and sex were con-
flated, so too were gender and sexual orientation.  He notes,
“[t]hrough inversion theory, sexuality became subsumed within
gender because the active/passive stances during or in sexual/pri-
vate intimacies were officially a part of the overall gender com-
posite being built for each sex on the basis of the active/passive
paradigm.”204  Because gender flowed naturally from biological
sex and gender subsumed sexuality, sexual orientation was con-
flated with gender.205  Thus, persons whose gender is female or
feminine would naturally and normally have a sexual orientation
toward persons who are male or masculine.  The converse was
also considered true.  If a male was masculine, he would be sexu-
ally oriented toward the passive and feminine.  The end result
was that men who were oriented toward men were considered to
be abnormal and gendered female (so called “sissies” and
“fags”), whereas women who were oriented toward other women
were considered abnormal and gendered male (so called
“dykes”).  Hence, gay men and lesbians automatically fell into
the wrong gender category.
Valdes’ research shows that the hatred leveled at homosexuals
is caused more by a distaste of the individual’s gender than by
the fact that he or she engages in sexual activity with members of
his or her own sex.206  For example, a number of studies that
Valdes cites define male homosexuals as men who are socially (or
sexually) more effeminate than society expects of men.  The
201 Id . at 52-56.
202 Id . at 50-51.
203 Id . at 84 (citing the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 532 (4th ed. 1994)).
204 Valdes, supra  note 195,  at 51.
205 Id .
206 See id . at 72 (discussing a study by the Mazet Committee investigating New
York public officials in 1899).
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studies consistently conflated the social behavior of “sissies” with
male homosexuality.207
In a remarkable study, a group of volunteer enlisted men were
sent to investigate the homosexual activities of servicemen at the
Newport Naval Training Center during 1919-1920.208  The volun-
teers engaged in sexual acts with the men and then tesified
against them in subsequent military and civilian trials.209  A study
by George Chauncey, Jr. demonstrated that the men who were
the decoys did not characterize themselves as homosexuals even
though they engaged in numerous same-sex sexual activities with
the defendants.210  Instead, the records demonstrate that they
considered themselves to be “real men” because their behavior
during the sexual activities was “masculine” and “more aggres-
sive” while the behavior of their homosexual subjects was passive
and receptive.211
A similar purge occurred in the Navy years later.  Right before
the Persian Gulf War, Valdes notes, an admiral directed all those
under his command to dismiss lesbians working in their midst.212
The admiral directed their removal because the lesbians might be
too aggressive and intimidating.213  According to Valdes, the ad-
miral was concerned that personnel under his command might be
reluctant to expose the lesbians because the lesbians were, ac-
cording to the admiral, hard-working, career-oriented and among
the top performers.214  Valdes concludes (and it appears rightly
so) that the admiral’s fears were not based on the lesbians’ sexual
activity or that their sexual activity would in some way interrupt
their work.215  Instead, he feared that the lesbians would be
threatening to the men because they may be more accomplished
in their positions than the men.216  In sum, the admiral feared
that the lesbians’ failure to conform to gender stereotypes, rather
207 Id . at 72-73.
208 Id .
209 Id . at 73.
210 Id . at 73-74.
211 Id . (citing George Chauncey, Jr., Christian Brotherhood or Sexual Perversion?
Homosexual Identities and the Construction of Sexual Boundaries in the World War I
Era , in DAVID F. GREENBERG, HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE GAY
AND LESBIAN PAST 294 (1989)).
212 Valdes, supra  note 195, at 95-96.
213 Id . at 95.
214 Id . at 95-96.
215 Id .
216 Id .
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than their sexual orientation, would cause problems on the ships.
Valdes notes that this is an example of the conflation of sexual
orientation with gender (and therefore with sex).217  According
to the law, the admiral could legally expose and dismiss lesbians
because they were lesbians.  He could not, however, dismiss wo-
men for their non-conformance with gender sterotypes.
Thus, Valdes demonstrates that permitting discrimination
based on sexual orientation actually reinforces discrimination
based on gender.  It therefore supports and reinforces illegal gen-
der discrimination, harming society, sexual minorities, and heter-
osexual women.
Professor Valdes states:
[T]he conflation’s impact on life and law is neither natural, nor
neutral, nor benign.  On the contrary, this conflation is a
highly problematic contrivance that exerts a divisive force on
society and a destabilizing influence in law: this conflation em-
bodies, excludes, and extends androsexist218 and heterosexist
biases, which engender and accentuate social and sexual rank-
ings and acrimonies in both law and society.  In other words,
this conflation constitutes and validates hetero-patriarchy.  As
such, it creates and reinforces artificial oppressive dictates and
distinctions that affect all of us, but that specifically impede
social and legal equality for (heterosexual) women and for
sexual minorities.219
Masculinities studies support Valdes’ findings.  Robert Connell
notes that hegemonic masculinity subordinates gay men and gay
masculinity, conflating it with femininity.  He states: “Gayness, in
patriarchal ideology, is the repository of whatever is symbolically
expelled from hegemonic masculinity . . . .  Hence, from the point
of view of hegemonic masculinity, gayness is easily assimilated to
femininity.  And hence—in the view of some gay theorists—the
ferocity of homophobic attacks.”220
Concepts of masculinity and sexual orientation are inextricably
intertwined.  Connell notes that in this society hegemonic mascu-
linity is defined exclusively as heterosexual.  Even the most ag-
gressive, competitive and masculine gay men are considered not
masculine, merely because of the identity of their sex partners.221
217 Id . at 97-99.
218 Professor Valdes uses the term “androsexism” to identify a type of sexism that
prefers or gives advantage to male ideals. See id . at 8.
219 Id . at 8 (citations omitted).
220 CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 78.
221 CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 162.  Connell states:
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Moreover, experience shows that men in predominately male
work environments often denigrate women and other males who
do not conform to gender norms, using gender specific language
that equates inferiority with being female or feminine.222  The
greatest insults lodged against other men, whether heterosexual
or homosexual, challenge their masculinity.  These insults include
clear references to the gender of the victim, referring to him in
terms used to refer to women, such as “bitch,” or that give him
characteristics of women, such as “pussy” or “milquetoast,” or
that conflate a lack of masculinity with homosexuality.  This be-
havior, which Robert Connell identifies as a symbolic blurring
with femininity, maintains the superiority of the masculine over
the feminine, of men over women.223
Gender scholars attribute this behavior to attempts to preserve
the job in question as masculine and the exclusive domain of
men.224  It reinforces the hegemonic masculinities from which
Patriarchal culture has a simple interpretation of gay men: they lack mascu-
linity.  This idea is expressed in an extraordinary variety of ways, ranging
from stale humour of the limp-wrist, panty-waist variety, to sophisticated
psychiatric investigations of the ‘aetiology’ of homosexuality in childhood.
The interpretation is obviously linked to the assumption our culture gener-
ally makes about the mystery of sexuality, that opposites attract.  If some-
one is attracted to the masculine, then that person must be feminine—if
not in the body, then somehow in the mind.
These beliefs . . . are pervasive.  Accordingly they create a dilemma about
masculinity for men who are attracted to other men.
Id . at 143.
222 See, e.g. , Sharon R. Bird, Welcome to the Men’s Club: Homosociality and the
Maintenance of Hegemonic Masculinity , 10 GENDER & SOC’Y 120, 122, 125-29
(1996) (concluding from her study of heterosexual males that homosociality—the
attraction of men in non-sexual ways to one another—is used to reinforce meanings
of hegemonic masculinity and differentiation from that which is feminine; when het-
erosexual men associated with each other they constantly reinforced the hegemonic
masculine behaviors of emotional detachment, competition and sexual objectifica-
tion of women, and encouraged suppression of “feminine” characteristics such as
expressing one’s feelings); Valorie K. Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: Challenging Mascu-
linity in Traditionally Male Institutions , 17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 68, 68-69 (2002)
(describing the hostile treatment of Shannon Faulkner, the first woman to integrate
the Citadel, a military college in South Carolina; the male students screamed ob-
scenities at Shannon, addressed death threats to her, scrawled on the bathroom wall
“Let her in—then fuck her to death”).  This behavior begins early.  Boys attack
other boys as being “girls” or “sissies” in the playground in elementary school. See
BARRIE THORNE, GENDER PLAY: GIRLS AND BOYS IN SCHOOL 115-18 (1999) (not-
ing the prevalent use of “sissy” as a derogatory term to refer to boys who like to do
“girl things,” as opposed to the term “tomboy,” to refer to girls who are athletic or
like comfortable clothing, in a relatively positive vein).
223 CONNELL, supra  note 8, at 79.
224 Patricia Yancey Martin, Gender, Interaction, and Inequality in Organizations ,
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men achieve a patriarchal dividend, an increase in income merely
because they are male.  Class and race are also involved.  For
example, in blue collar jobs, these practices, which are often vio-
lent in nature, reinforce the masculine identities of the job hold-
ers, protecting their fragile place in the hierarchy and permit
them to challenge the “limp-wristed paper pusher” managers
whose jobs are less masculine.225
If permitted by law, the conflation of certain types of work
with men, and men with hegemonic masculinities, clearly privi-
leges gender-conforming men over women and gender-noncon-
forming men.  It leads to environments that are abusive to
women and gender-nonconforming men because of their sex, and
it creates an entire class of jobs that exclude all but the most
daring women and gender-nonconforming men.  If the courts do
not recognize that this behavior discriminates because of a per-
son’s sex in violation of Title VII, they reinforce the hegemonic
masculinities, the superiority of masculine men and the inferi-
ority of women, and the gender differences in pay and experi-
ence.  In other words, they contribute to the dynamic stasis of
women at work.
Title VII makes it illegal to discriminate against an individual
because of sex.  The crucial question is whether a legitimate in-
terpretation of Title VII would permit a holding that discrimina-
tion because of sex includes discrimination because of sexual
in GENDER, INTERACTION, AND INEQUALITY 217 (Cecilia L. Ridgeway, ed. 1992)
(noting that men attempt to exclude women peers because they fear that women’s
presence will undermine the masculinity requirements of the job leading to lower
status and pay); WILLIAMS, supra  note 8, at 77-79; James E. Gruber, The Impact of
Male Work Environments and Organizational Policies on Women’s Experiences of
Sexual Harassment , 12 GENDER & SOC’Y 301, 314 (1998) (finding that predomi-
nately male environments are more physically hostile and threatening to women and
men are more likely to mark their work environments with symbols of the sexual
objectification of women); Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment , supra
note 23, at 1687. Cf . Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race and Criminal Justice ,
52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 793-96 (finding that “hypermasculinity,” including aggression
and violence in police work, is a means of maintaining a masculine identity of the
job and the men in the job).  Interestingly, sociologist Barrie Thorne has found that
boys who are good athletes, popular, and masculine can more easily “cross over” to
play with the girls in elementary school without harming their reputations. See
THORNE, supra  note 222, at 122-23.
225 WILLIAMS, supra  note 8, at 78 (stating that the hidden injuries of class exper-
ienced by male blue-collar workers create the incentive to define their own work as
truly masculine); Harris, supra  note 224, at 785 (noting that on shop floors, workers
see their positions as signifying the “true masculinity . . . an alternative to the hege-
monic form associated with managers”).
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orientation.  Masculinities studies clearly support such a holding.
One tenet of those studying masculinities is that the exaggerated
and socially constituted differences between two polar opposites,
male and female, maintain the power structure that privileges
men over women.226  These theorists advocate the degendering
of women and men as a social movement.  Moreover, feminist
sociologist Judith Lorber argues that the division between heter-
osexuality and homosexuality is not as clear-cut as society repre-
sents.  She argues that it is difficult empirically to support the
conventional sexual categories because sexual desire, preference
and orientation belong to a spectrum of responses that are often
tempered by social and cultural restrictions and pressures.  The
bipolarity of opposites between homosexuality and heterosexual-
ity, like the bipolarity of men and women, male and female, rein-
forces the superiority of men over women, and gender-
conforming men over gender-nonconforming men.227
Since its passage in 1964, Title VII has undergone a dynamic
interpretive evolution, consistent with enormous societal changes
in attitudes and values occurring over the past forty years.  These
changes include the incorporation of the disparate impact theory
of litigation and the recognition of affirmative action as permissi-
ble,228 the decision to include pregnancy discrimination as sex
discrimination,229 the emergence of sexual harassment as a form
of sex discrimination,230 the application of sexual harassment law
to same-sex harassment,231 and the explicit expansion of the pro-
tected category of sex from coverage of biological sex alone to
226 See  Lorber, supra  note 21, at 153-55.
227 Id . at 146-47.
228 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 69-
80 (1994) (discussing the “dynamic” interpretation of Title VII to create a cause of
action under the disparate impact theory and the consequent decision that at least
some forms of affirmative action do not violate Title VII); see also  Ann C. McGin-
ley, Affirmative Action Awash in Confusion: Backward-Looking-Future-Oriented
Justifications for Race-Conscious Measures , 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 209,
221-22 (1998).
229 See  McGinley & Stempel, supra  note 187, at 235-42 (discussing the amend-
ment of Title VII to create the Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
230 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WO-
MEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).  After Professor MacKinnon pub-
lished her book in 1979, the EEOC promulgated guidelines defining sexual
harassment as sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.  29 C.F.R. 1604.11 (1985).
The Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for sexual harassment as sex dis-
crimination violative of Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S.
57, 73 (1986).
231 See  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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the broader coverage of discrimination based on sex and gender,
or failure to conform to societal gender expectations.232  Some of
these changes initiated with legal scholars, litigants and the
EEOC, culminating in the Supreme Court’s expanded interpreta-
tion of the statute.233  In other cases, the Supreme Court’s con-
servative interpretation of the statute led to congressional
amendments that liberalize the statute.234  Whether the evolution
occurs through interpretation or amendment, it is dynamic and
informed by specialists in the social sciences, including sociology,
psychology, and feminist studies.
Currently a substantial body of gender and masculinities stud-
ies defines sexual preference or sexual orientation as part of
Gender.235  Judith Lorber, for instance, argues that Gender in-
232 In Price Waterhouse , the Court expanded the definition of “sex” to include
“gender,” or the set of societal expectations to which a person of a particular biolog-
ical sex should conform. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 260 (1989).
Price Waterhouse  made clear that discrimination against a person for failure to con-
form to societal expectations “required” of the person’s biological sex is discrimina-
tion because of sex. Id . at 251-52.  Recently, the Seventh Circuit stated that
discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII is limited to discrimination based on
“biological sex.” See  Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1082-84 (7th Cir.
2000) (relying on a case decided before Price Waterhouse  to determine that the term
“sex” means “‘biological male or biological female,’ and not one’s sexuality or sex-
ual orientation”).  This holding, while most likely consistent with the expectations
and purposes of the members of Congress who passed the bill into law in 1964, is too
narrow given Price Waterhouse  and subsequent lower court decisions.
233 For example, the Supreme Court has interpreted sexual harassment to create a
cause of action for sex discrimination and has expanded that interpretation to same-
sex harassment. See Oncale , 523 U.S. at 78.
234 For example, after the Supreme Court cut back on its interpretation of the
disparate impact theory of Title VII claims in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio ,
490 U.S. 642 (1971), Congress reacted by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
overruling much of Wards Cove  and explicitly recognizing the disparate impact
cause of action in the text of Title VII for the first time. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A) (2000).
235 I use the term “Gender” with a capital “G” to denote Judith Lorber’s defini-
tion of Gender as an overarching category.  Lorber notes:
Gender is an overarching category—a major social status that organizes
almost all areas of social life.  Therefore bodies and sexuality are gendered;
biology, physiology, and sexuality, in contrast, do not add up to gender,
which is a social institution that establishes patterns of expectations for in-
dividuals, orders the social processes of everyday life, is built into the major
social organizations of society, such as the economy, ideology, the family,
and politics, and is also an entity in and of itself.
For an individual, the components of gender are the sex category assigned
at birth on the basis of the appearance of the genitalia; gender identity;
gendered sexual orientation; marital and procreative status; a gendered
personality structure; gender beliefs and attitudes; gender displays; and
work and family roles.  All these social components are supposed to be
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cludes three theoretically distinct categories, all of which are so-
cially constructed in different ways:236 1) biological or
physiological sex;237 2) sexuality, which includes sexual desire,
preferences, and orientation; and 3) gender, a social status that
sometimes has a sexual identity.238  While these categories may
be theoretically distinct and capable of separation for research
purposes, as a practical matter, it is impossible to distinguish be-
tween sexuality and Gender (both as used by Lorber) in deter-
mining the motivations for, or causation of, harassing behavior.
The courts’ attempt to distinguish a hostile environment
caused either by the victim’s failure to conform to sex stereo-
types or by the victim’s sexual orientation is cramped and unper-
suasive.  Moreover, courts appear mean-spirited and undignified
as they seek to distinguish vulgar expressions and physical at-
tacks resulting from the harasser’s disgust for the victim’s failure
to conform to gender norms from expressions and attacks caused
by the victim’s sexual orientation, real or perceived.  Through
their opinions, courts become complicit in endorsing the very en-
vironment that supports aggressive, competitive, brash, hege-
monic masculinity.
Men who are punished at work for not conforming to gender
norms or for their sexual orientation or both should be accorded
consistent and congruent with perceived physiology.  The actual combina-
tion of genes and genitalia; prenatal, adolescent, and adult hormonal input;
and procreative capacity may or may not be congruous with each other and
with the components of gender and sexuality, and the components may
also not line up neatly on only one side of the binary divide.
Lorber, supra  note 21, at 146-47.  I use the term “gender” with a lower case “g” to
mean “gender” connected with social status. See infra  note 238.
236 See  Lorber, supra  note 21, at 146-47.
237 Lorber argues that even biological sex is contestable, focusing on the large
number of babies born who are of indecipherable sex at birth.  She notes that male
and female genitalia develop from the same tissue, and that a minimum of one in
one thousand babies is born with ambiguous genitalia.  Lorber, supra  note 21, at 147
(citing Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not
Enough , THE SCIENCES, Mar. - Apr. 1993, at 21.
Lorber notes that when a child is born with ambiguous sexuality—XY chromo-
somes and anomalous genitalia—the doctors officially categorize the child by label-
ing it a “boy” or a “girl,” depending on the penis size.  If the penis is very small, the
doctors perform surgery to make an artificial vagina and label the child a girl. See
Lorber, supra  note 21, at 147.  Lorber contends that the categorization of the ambig-
uous as either female or male sustains the false notion that there are clear-cut differ-
ences between the two sexes. Id . at 148.
238 See  Lorber, supra  note 21, at 146. See generally  David M. Skover & Kellye Y.
Testy, LesBiGay Identity as Commodity , 90 CAL. L. REV. 223 (2002) (arguing that
academics must recognize and negotiate the commodification of LesBiGay identity).
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the same dignity granted to women to avoid sexual harass-
ment.239  Furthermore, the interpretation of Title VII to permit
the harassment of these men undermines equal rights for women
at work.  Masculinities studies demonstrates that the very meth-
ods used to harass nonconforming men is based on the superior-
ity of men over women, the masculine over the feminine.240
These methods, if permitted to continue, confirm that women
(and nonconforming men) do not belong in many workplaces
that are predominately male.  Without desegregating these work-
places and breaking down the gender identification of the job, it
is virtually impossible to achieve equality for women.241
The courts should consider using masculinities theory to rede-
fine “because of sex.”  Masculinities theory can demonstrate that
discrimination because of sex should redress harmful behavior
caused by all three aspects of gender as Lorber defines it: biologi-
cal sex, sexuality, and gender.  In other words, masculinities the-
ory demonstrates that discrimination because of sexual
orientation is discrimination because of sex.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against defining Title
VII’s term “because of sex” to include sexual orientation is that
Congress has attempted and failed to amend the statute on nu-
merous recent occasions to include sexual orientation as a pro-
hibited reason for discrimination.242  Masculinities research
demonstrates that there is no distinction between gender discrim-
ination and discrimination based on sexual orientation, and the
Court has already banned gender discrimination—sex stereotyp-
ing.  However, there is a good argument that Title VII already
prohibits sexual orientation discrimination under the Price
239 See generally  Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment With Respect , 111
HARV. L. REV. 445 (1997); Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a
Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harassment , 88 GEO. L.J. 1 (1999).
240 See  Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orienta-
tion: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence , 105 YALE L.J. 1,
18, 33, 47 (1995) (noting that many cases interpret Price Waterhouse  not to apply to
the feminine male and arguing that this devaluation of the feminine harms not only
the individual effeminate male, but also women as a group).
241 See  Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial Interpreta-
tions of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument , 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (1990) (noting negative conse-
quences of segregation for women including lower wages, less status, and fewer op-
portunities for advancement).
242 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, H.R. 3285, 108th Cong. (2003);
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1997, H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. (1997); Em-
ployment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (2d Sess. 1994).
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Waterhouse  stereotyping doctrine.  The cases attempting to dis-
tinguish between discrimination based on sex stereotyping and
on sexual orientation, as demonstrated above, fail miserably to
draw a principled distinction between the two.
Moreover, political theorists have demonstrated that the politi-
cal process is an inconsistent and imprecise measure of the sup-
port of the majority of the voting public for a particular issue.243
The research on the distortion of the political process by monied
interests demonstrates that in an area that is so fraught with emo-
tion, it will be extremely difficult to amend the statute to offer
protection to persons based on their sexual orientation,244 even
though a majority of the public may well support the concept that
persons who are homosexuals should not be discriminated
against at work because of their sexual orientation.245  Further-
more, because social conservatives put significant money behind
opposing gay and lesbian rights, the information concerning the
amendment to the statute may be distorted: many people believe
243 See, e.g. , WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
52-61 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing Kenneth Arrow’s public choice theory concerning
the incoherence of majority-voting, transaction theories of legislation and the empir-
ical studies challenging the all-encompassing power of interest groups, and underes-
timating the power of the President in blocking or passing legislation) [hereinafter
ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION]; William N. Es-
kridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents , 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1406 (1988) (noting
that public choice theory demonstrates that the political process tends to “pander to
small, well-organized groups”) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overruling Statutory
Precedents].
244 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra
note 243, at 58 (noting that Schlozman and Tierney’s empirical studies support the
position that an interest group tends to be more influential “[w]hen the group is
seeking to block new legislation rather than to promote a new policy, because there
are so many opportunities for an organized group to kill or delay new legislation”)
(citing KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 395 (1986)); see also  Eskridge, Overruling Statutory
Precedents , supra  note 243, at 1407 (explaining that legislators get themselves re-
elected by refusing to make tough political choices that harm important interest
groups). Cf . Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms , 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583,
1613-17, 1620-26 (1998) (suggesting through use of psychological studies that people
in contract negotiations prefer inaction over action).
245 There is research that would lead one to conclude that conservative Christians
in particular are very hostile, for religious reasons, toward the presence of persons in
their midst who are openly homosexual. See, e.g., THOMAS J. LINNEMAN, WEATH-
ERING CHANGE: GAYS AND LESBIANS, CHRISTIAN CONSERVATIVES, AND EVERY-
DAY HOSTILITIES (2003) (studying the hostile attitudes of Christian conservatives
toward lesbians and gays).
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that adding sexual orientation provides special protection for les-
bians and gays, protection not afforded to other persons.246  Re-
search suggests that most Americans believe it should be illegal
to discriminate against gays and lesbians in the workplace for
their sexual orientation.247  Thus, it seems that the political pro-
cess does not operate properly in this arena.248
Because of the distortion of the political process, the courts
should not interpret the failure of Congress to amend the statute
to conclude that Title VII should not and does not prohibit dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation.249  This point is consis-
246 See  William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay
Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review , 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327,
1352-53 (2000) (observing that those opposing laws prohibiting discrimination based
on sexual orientation argue that such bills grant “special rights” to gays and lesbi-
ans).  Eskridge argues that there is a new rhetoric surrounding the anti-gay dis-
course: the “no promo homo,” which supports the concept that it is not in the states’
interest to promote homosexuality because heterosexuality is preferable. Id . at
1329, 1338-39.  While appearing reasonable, the “no promo homo” argument masks
invidiously discriminatory reasons for opposing legislation that prohibits discrimina-
tion against members of the GLBT community. Id . at 1363-65.  Eskridge opines,
however, that the “no promo homo” argumentation cannot maintain its distance
from the “status-subordinating features of anti-gay policies.” Id . at 1365.  He argues
that the “no promo homo” arguments actually seek “both status denigration and
identity censorship, which for GLBT people are closely linked.” Id .; see also  How-
arth, supra note 20, at 227 (“‘Special treatment’ is serious, powerful coded language
in U.S. culture wars about racial justice, gay and lesbian rights, and women’s
rights.”).
The failure of courts to recognize that sexual orientation discrimination is discrim-
ination because of sex and the attempts to distinguish discrimination based on sexual
orientation from discrimination based on sex stereotyping seems to do the same
thing: the only basis for refusing to include sexual orientation in the definition of
“sex” is to permit discrimination based on status, membership in a particular, dis-
crete minority group, and to permit censorship of GLBT people in the workplace.
247 In the hearings on the Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, Senator
Kennedy noted that according to a 2003 Gallup study, 88% of Americans believe
that gays and lesbians should have equal job opportunities. Employment Non-Dis-
crimination Act of 2003: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Health, Educ., Labor &
Pensions , 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
248 For an explanation of why a legislature may not act to overturn the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of a statute, see Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents ,
supra  note 243, at 1403-05, for a list of five reasons other than legislative approval
for the Court’s decision for legislative inaction.  These same reasons are applicable
here.  Eskridge states that “[t]he vagaries of the political process make it hard to
determine what Congress’ ‘positive inaction’ meant.” Id . at 1405.
249 Furthermore, there is some question as to whether it is even constitutional for
the courts to attempt to draw the line between gender discrimination and discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation.  In Romer v. Evans , 517 U.S. 620 (1996),  the
Supreme Court struck down as violative of the Equal Protection Clause a Colorado
Constitutional Amendment that prohibited the enforcement of any anti-discrimina-
tion ordinances as applied to sexual orientation.  The Court held that the constitu-
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tent with the expressed view of one of the most conservative
members of the U.S. Supreme Court.  Justice Scalia has opined in
many Court opinions that the failure of Congress to act should
not be interpreted to demonstrate its consent to the courts’ statu-
tory interpretation.250
c. Other-Sex Harassment “Because of Sex”
Masculinities studies can also help courts and juries determine
whether other-sex harassment is because of sex. Oncale  made
clear that Title VII forbids hostile work environment harassment
because of sex whether the motivation for the harassment is sex-
ual attraction or hostility.  It also explained that sexual and non-
sexual harassing treatment should be considered in determining
whether there is a hostile work environment because of sex.251
Lower courts, however, encounter difficulty in determining that
some other-sex harassing behavior is because of sex rather than
because of personal animosity.  An example is Galloway v. Gen-
eral Motors Service Parts Operations , in which the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in a
sexual harassment case, concluding that the terms “sick bitch”
and “bitch,” combined with other verbal abuse and obscene ges-
tures directed at a woman who was previously the lover of the
harasser, was not a sex- or gender-related term as a matter of
law.252  The relevant portion of the opinion states:
It is true that “bitch” is rarely used of heterosexual males
(though some heterosexual male teenagers have taken re-
cently to calling each other “bitch”).  But it does not necessa-
tional amendment was based on bias and hatred against a specific group—
homosexuals—and was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
Romer , 517 U.S. at 634-36.  In Lawrence v. Texas , 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the Supreme
Court held that a Texas statute that provided criminal sanctions for engaging in sod-
omy was violative of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment because it
interfered with the right of liberty of every adult citizen to engage in consensual
intimate relations with other adults.  These cases could be interpreted to prohibit the
courts and the Congress from making the distinction between homosexuals and
heterosexuals, a distinction which arguably is based on bias and invidiousness.
250 See, e.g. , Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292 (2001); Johnson v. Transp.
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
251 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. , 523 U.S. 57, 81 (1998); see supra
Part I and note 23; see also  Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment , supra
note 23, at 1687 (explaining that most of the harassment suffered by women is not
sexual in nature but instead involves non-sexual actions by men attempting to un-
dermine their female colleagues’ perceived (or actual) competence in order to pro-
tect their “bastions of masculine competence and authority”).
252 78 F.3d 1164, 1167 (7th Cir. 1996).
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rily connote some specific female characteristic, whether true,
false, or stereotypical; it does not draw attention to the wo-
man’s sexual or maternal characteristics or to other respects in
which women might be thought to be inferior to men in the
workplace, or unworthy of equal dignity and respect.  In its
normal usage, it is simply a pejorative term for “woman.”  If
Bullock had called Galloway a “sick woman,” and a similarly
situated male coworker a “sick man,” there would be no
ground for an inference of sex discrimination.  And, likewise,
were there a similarly situated male worker to Galloway
whom Bullock called a “sick bastard” while calling her a “sick
bitch,” we do not think it would be rational for a trier of fact
to infer that Bullock was making the workplace more uncon-
genial for women than for men.  Even if Bullock didn’t abuse
any men, there would not be an automatic inference from his
use of the word “bitch” that his abuse of a woman was moti-
vated by her gender rather than by a personal dislike unre-
lated to gender.253
This opinion, written by Judge Posner, demonstrates the Sev-
enth Circuit’s failure to understand the derogatory, gendered na-
ture of the term “bitch,” the unequal personal relationships that
many women endure, and the structural inequalities of gender at
work.  These attitudes contribute to the dynamic stasis of women
at work.  A woman at work who is subjected to repeated behav-
ior such as name-calling and obscene gestures, combined with the
term “bitch” and “sick bitch,” works, at least arguably, in a hos-
tile work environment because of her sex.  Masculinities studies
can help the judge and the fact finder in this case to recognize
that the aggressive, hostile treatment of a female worker may be
a masculinity that establishes the superiority of the male over the
female in a personal relationship, which, in this case, spills over
into the workplace.  The purpose of this aggression, occurring at
work, could be in large part to punish a woman for not con-
forming to the feminine stereotype of dependence on her man.
As in Galloway , for example, the harassment may occur as a
means to control the woman or in order to punish her for her
resistance to her partner’s control.254  This harasser’s behavior
closely mirrors domestic violence which becomes more acute
when the victim attempts to assert her own independence from a
domineering partner.255  When this behavior is brought into the
253 Id . at 1168.
254 See id .
255 See LORBER, supra  note 7, at 71-72.
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workplace and tolerated by the employer, a jury should be per-
mitted to draw the inference that the behavior is because of sex.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, even though courts af-
ter Oncale  generally agree that sexual and non-sexual behavior
because of one’s sex can be considered in a harassment case,
there are no reported cases in which the harassing behavior has
no gender or sexual components to it.  This is an especially im-
portant area for women who work in jobs where their male col-
leagues are relatively sophisticated in their understanding of the
anti-discrimination laws.  These women can be harassed merci-
lessly because of their sex without there being any mention of sex
or any gender-based comments.
A hypothetical should demonstrate this point.  Assume a law
school named the Southern Elite Less Law School (SELLS).
The fortyish white male members of the faculty are good schol-
ars, have graduated from good law schools, and are very troubled
by their inability to move to more prestigious law schools.  They
believe that there are many women and minorities who have
been hired at higher ranking law schools who are not as good as
they are.  These men call themselves the EXCELS (Excellent
Law Scholars).
The junior untenured faculty is the most diverse group of
faculty ever employed at SELLS: Black, Latina, and white wo-
men, as well as two white men and a Latino.  The untenured wo-
men form a close bond with each other and with two tenured
women.  The group of untenured women are generally about the
same age as the EXCELS and are fairly confident in their abili-
ties and viewpoints; they do not see their role as submissive to
the EXCELS.  Furthermore, their credentials are equal to, if not
better than, those of the EXCELS.  Early on in their careers at
SELLS, the untenured women and at least one tenured woman
protest to the dean about the pervasive environment of sexual
harassment of the students at the law school.  Moreover, they ar-
gue for an increase in minority faculty hiring.  Both of these posi-
tions anger the EXCELS.  They feel that the women should keep
their mouths shut about sexual harassment, and they do not be-
lieve that there are any qualified minority faculty to hire.
The EXCELS treat the two untenured white males and the un-
tenured Latino well.  They also invite into their ranks a tenured
woman on the faculty who was once a noted scholar, but who has
not published for years.  Despite her lack of scholarship, this wo-
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man curries favor with the EXCELS by agreeing with them pub-
licly and often doing their dirty work.  Together with the one
woman, they verbally attack the young, untenured women on the
faculty, to their faces and behind their backs.  Since the EXCELS
accept one woman into their ranks and treat well one man of
color, they believe that their actions are safe from accusations of
gender and race bias.
The EXCELS describe themselves as the “scholars” who up-
hold standards through scholarship.  They disparage the senior
faculty and the women and persons of color, labeling the senior
faculty DINOSAURS; white women and women of color are the
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HIRES or simply THE EXPERI-
MENT.  They also describe the women as “anti-standards,”
“anti-scholarship,” and “service-oriented,” even though some of
the women have produced more scholarship than any of the EX-
CELS had at the corresponding point in their careers.  Two se-
nior men also eventually earn the title of “anti-standards” and
“anti-scholarship,” because they break ranks by openly defend-
ing the scholarship of the untenured women.  One of these “anti-
scholarship” men has published more scholarly articles and
books than any other faculty member.
The institution accords the EXCELS power, prestige, and re-
spect.  A majority of EXCELS or persons they control sits on the
most powerful committees; the dean condones their process-per-
verting tactics, and rewards them with status and/or economic
benefits.  The university president seeks their counsel on deci-
sions affecting the law school.
Although generally the senior faculty may not agree with the
EXCELS’ tactics, the EXCELS assiduously court them before
important faculty meetings in order to assure the senior faculty’s
votes.  At SELLS, there is little or no process.  Most decisions
are made in office discussions from which the women and minor-
ities are excluded.  These pre-meeting decisions are often used to
screen out qualified women and persons of color as faculty candi-
dates, and to tarnish the reputations of the untenured women
and persons of color at SELLS as they are considered for tenure
and promotion.
The untenured women are aware of the EXCELS’ disdain.  It
is evident in all of their interactions, including faculty meetings.
This environment, which the untenured and at least two of the
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tenured women perceive subjectively to be hostile and harassing,
creates stress in the women, causing many to seek medical help.
Many courts would recognize that the environment at SELLS
is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and condi-
tions of the women’s jobs but would conclude that it does not
constitute harassment because of their sex.  This conclusion
would rest on the absence of a sexually hostile environment and
of gender-based references.  Nonetheless, the women who suffer
this environment should be able to sue using the sex harassment
law.  Masculinities theory would aid the court in understanding
why this harassment occurred because of the women’s sex.  First,
gender and masculinities theory would emphasize that the wo-
men did not conform with the established sex stereotypes of
compliance with and subversion to their senior male faculty col-
leagues.  The women had their own opinions and were willing to
voice them.  These opinions were particularly troublesome to the
male faculty because they dealt with issues of sexual harassment
and minority hiring, topics which the more established faculty did
not want to discuss.  By viewing the culture at SELLS through
the lens of masculinities theory, a court would note the presence
of careerism in the law school.  The identities of male faculty
members are very much involved in moving to a more prestigious
school.  This careerism, in turn, harms the women.  Masculinities
theory would also explain the men’s use of authoritarianism and
informalism to gain control.  The EXCELS expected that the
junior women would submit to their demands and not disagree
with them.  Moreover, men used informalism to build relation-
ships with their untenured male colleagues and the senior men.
These informal networks worked to the disadvantage of the wo-
men at work.  Finally, masculinities fieldwork, demonstrating
that women are described as unduly aggressive when they do not
submit to the expected social stereotypes of women, would ac-
count for the men’s severe reaction to their more junior female
colleagues.
In other situations, masculinities theory would explain that a
workplace that includes demands on women’s emotional labor,
combined with an informal network benefitting male workers256
256 See, e.g ., Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir. 1997) (failing to
understand why the plaintiff’s allegation that she was excluded because she was not
“one of the boys” would be because of sex, given that a man could also be similarly
excluded).
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and demands of working long hours,257 may create a hostile work
environment for some women because of their sex.
This theory should help the judge and/or jury place into con-
text the experiences of the individual plaintiff.  While a woman’s
exclusion from a trip to a baseball game with the “guys,” an ex-
pectation that she listen to the men’s personal problems, or a
requirement that she work into the evening may not alone be
sufficient to create a hostile work environment because of her
sex, masculinities studies would help place these individual oc-
currences into a framework of gendered relations and power.
Her exclusion from the trip to the ball game may seem insignifi-
cant, but, when combined with the other masculinities at work, it
may be very significant.258  It may be one piece of evidence of the
informalism practiced by men that places women at a disadvan-
tage at work.
While men’s expectations that women provide emotional com-
fort may seem natural, masculinities studies demonstrate that
men expect this emotional labor of a woman, but would not re-
quire the same work of a man in the same position.  Combined
with testimony from a plaintiff who may spend inordinate
amounts of time giving comfort to the men, or in contrast, is con-
sidered a “bitch” for refusing to provide such comfort, masculini-
ties studies may be key to helping a woman prove that her
treatment at work is different from the men’s and sufficiently se-
vere or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her
work.259
In other words, masculinities studies can help demonstrate that
257 Joan Williams attributes the inequality of women at work in professional and
managerial positions to the glass ceiling, the “maternal wall,” the executive sched-
ule, the marginalization of part-time work, and relocation (the woman’s inability to
relocate because of her husband’s job or having to relocate because of his job). See
WILLIAMS, supra  note 8, at 69-76.  Williams attributes the inequality in working class
jobs to the designing of blue-collar jobs around men’s bodies, access to family work,
and the policing of masculinity at work. Id . at 76-81 (observing that blue-collar jobs
are highly segregated with 45% of men and only 10% of women holding these jobs;
white women hold only 2.1% and black women hold only 2.2 % of the best blue-
collar jobs in production, precision, and craft occupations).
258 See generally  Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count as Terms, Condi-
tions or Privileges of Employment Under Title VII? , 37 B.C. L. REV. 643 (1996).
259 See LORBER, supra  note 7, at 243-44 (noting that women leaders are expected
to be “empathic, considerate of others’ feelings, and attuned to the personal”; if they
fail to have these characteristics, they are criticized for being “abrasive,” even
though men with similar personalities are not criticized for their style; in contrast, a
more conciliatory style is criticized as being not sufficiently authoritative).
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the expectations that men have of women and men at work differ
and that these expectations, fulfilled or not, place women at a
distinct disadvantage.  If a woman fulfills the expectations, she
may spend hours of her work time on this emotional work, creat-
ing stress and feelings of inferiority and affecting her ability to
accomplish the more visible requirements of her job.260  If a wo-
man does not fulfill these expectations, the men may treat her
less favorably, either taunting her or concluding that she is not a
“team player.”
A hostile environment because of sex can also occur when wo-
men are harassed for their failure to conform to gender-based
stereotypes, especially when the job itself is defined with refer-
ence to these stereotypes.  If women in these “women’s” jobs
take control, speak out at work, or behave in a way that is not
subservient to the men, they can suffer harassment because of
their sex.  Jennifer Pierce’s Gender Trials  demonstrates that wo-
men paralegals were evaluated by their supervisors more harshly
if they were not compliant, not friendly enough, and in other
ways did not conform to the stereotype of a woman “helper.”261
If the male attorneys or paralegals harass the women paralegals
because they did not conform to gender stereotypes, these wo-
men should be able to prove that their harassment occurred be-
cause of their sex, even if the means of the harassing behavior
was neither overtly sexual nor overtly related to the women’s
gender.
d. Masculinities and the “Severe or Pervasive” Requirement
(i) Summary Judgment and Hostile Work Environments
As mentioned above, besides demonstrating that harassment
occurs because of the victim’s sex, a plaintiff alleging sex harass-
ment must also prove that the harassment was sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her work.262  In
determining whether a hostile work environment exists, the
260 The “time bind” created by expectations of emotional labor can be even more
problematic for women because the research shows that even women who make as
much money as their male partners spend significantly more time caring for their
homes and their children and taking care of the family’s relations with the schools,
friends, and others. See LORBER, supra  note 7, at 175, 183, 185. See generally
ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND
HOME BECOMES WORK (1997).
261 See supra  notes 87, 126-40 and accompanying text.
262 See supra  notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
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courts have little trouble concluding that plaintiffs meet the sub-
jective standard.  However, the objective standard, especially
when combined with the procedural summary judgment stan-
dard,263 has created difficulties for the lower courts. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc.  requires that a court grant a defendant’s mo-
tion for summary judgment in a hostile work environment case
only if the court concludes that there is insufficient evidence in
the record from which a reasonable jury can conclude that the
plaintiff should prevail.264  Combining the summary judgment
standard with the substantive standard in a hostile work environ-
ment case, the inquiry is: whether there is sufficient evidence in
the record from which a reasonable jury can conclude that the
plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a
reasonable person would consider the harassment sufficiently se-
vere or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employ-
ment.  The court must employ this inquiry drawing all reasonable
inferences in the favor of the plaintiff, and refusing to weigh the
evidence itself.265  This is a high order for any court and espe-
cially difficult for courts working under the press of increased
filings of employment discrimination cases266 and the pressure to
dispose of cases pretrial.267
Law professor Theresa Beiner has criticized the federal district
courts for inappropriately granting summary judgment in situa-
tions where a reasonable person could conclude that the environ-
ment created is “severe or pervasive,”268 thereby usurping the
jury’s proper role of fact finder.269  In The Misuse of Summary
263 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) states:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
264 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (holding that the federal courts must consider the
substantive evidentiary standard of proof when deciding motions for summary judg-
ment).  For a discussion of the summary judgment standards after Anderson , see
generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering
View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process , 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988).
265 Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255.
266 See  Becker, supra  note 86, at 1520 (noting that the number of employment
discrimination cases filed rose from 8,290 in 1990 to 23,547 in 1997).
267 Id .
268 Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment
Cases , 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 99-119 (1999).
269 In an earlier article, I criticized the lower federal courts for inappropriately
granting summary judgment in cases brought under Title VII and the Age Discrimi-
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Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases , Beiner documents the
increasing use of summary judgment to dispose of hostile envi-
ronment cases on the issue of severity or pervasiveness.270  She
demonstrates that the federal district courts grant summary judg-
ment inappropriately in hostile environment cases by improperly
drawing inferences in favor of the moving party, making credibil-
ity determinations, and substituting their judgment for that of the
fact finder, to conclude that, as a matter of law, the conditions at
the defendant’s workplace are not sufficiently severe or perva-
sive to hold the defendant liable.271
Since Beiner’s article appeared, there have been many more
cases in which the courts of appeals have concluded that, as a
matter of law, the plaintiff did not present evidence from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that the harassment was suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of em-
ployment.  In many of these cases, there appear to exist genuine
issues of material fact to create a jury issue of the severity or
pervasiveness of the harassment.272
For example, in Duncan v. General Motors Corp. , the plaintiff
testified that her manager requested that she meet him off-
site.273  When the plaintiff went to the meeting, her supervisor
told her of his troubled marriage and propositioned her.274
Plaintiff refused.  After this event, the supervisor expressed hos-
tility toward the plaintiff, becoming more critical of her work,
and telling her that she was incompetent.275  He also directed her
to create a training document on his computer, which displayed a
picture of a naked woman.276  He touched the plaintiff’s hand
unnecessarily numerous times and asked her to make an illustra-
tion of a planter he had in his office that was shaped as a “Mexi-
can” man slouching and wearing a sombrero with a hole in the
nation in Employment Act of 1967. See generally  Ann C. McGinley, Credulous
Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title
VII and the ADEA Cases , 34 B.C. L. REV. 203 (1993). See also  Becker, supra  note
86, at 1517-20 (describing the prevalence and misuse of summary judgment in em-
ployment discrimination cases).
270 Beiner, supra  note 268, at 101 (documenting federal district court cases grant-
ing summary judgment on the basis of insufficient severity or pervasiveness from
1987 through August 17, 1998).
271 Id . at 103-19.
272 See infra  notes 273-88 and accompanying text.
273 300 F.3d 928, 930 (8th Cir. 2002).
274 Id .
275 Id .
276 Id .
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front of his pants with a cactus protruding from where his penis
should be.277  The supervisor also twice showed the plaintiff a
pacifier that was shaped like a penis.278  He created a “recruit-
ment poster” portraying the plaintiff as the CEO of the “Man
Hater’s Club of America,” and asked the plaintiff to type a draft
of the beliefs of the “He-Men Women Hater’s Club.”279  The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff.280  Despite considerable evi-
dence demonstrating that the plaintiff’s supervisor had subjected
her to a constant barrage of hostile treatment, the Eighth Circuit
overturned the jury verdict, holding that as a matter of law the
harassment in question was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the plaintiff’s terms and conditions of employment.281
Another example of the court’s intrusion into the jury’s prov-
ince is Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co.282  In Scusa , the plaintiff and a
coworker filed charges of sexual harassment.283  The plaintiff al-
leged that she was ostracized and isolated by her coworkers, and
that a coworker had patted her buttocks, blown kisses, and made
sexual comments to her.284  She also alleged that another co-
worker had teased her, picked on her and thumped her on her
head, making fun of the way she dressed and ate; a third em-
ployee had approached her saying, “[y]ou need to get your f——
— story straight;” another coworker had made threatening ges-
tures, shaking his fist and cursing at her during a meeting discuss-
ing sexual harassment complaints and the company sexual
harassment policy.285  Other coworkers treated her rudely,
slammed doors in her face, glared at her and keyed her car.286
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant,
holding that as a matter of law, the harassment was insufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s terms and conditions of
employment.287  The Eighth Circuit affirmed.288
There is no question that a reasonable jury could conclude in
277 Id .
278 Id .
279 Id . at 932.
280 Id . at 933.
281 Id . at 935.
282 181 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1999).
283 Id . at 961.
284 Id .
285 Id .
286 Id .
287 Id . at 963-64.
288 Id . at 961.
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these cases that the women were subjected to harassment that
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile working
environment that altered the terms and conditions of the plain-
tiffs’ employment.  The courts intruded into the fact-finding func-
tions of the jury, simply overstepping their boundaries and
getting away with it.289
(ii) Disaggregation of Sexual and Gender-Based Evidence
A second problem courts encounter in determining whether
harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms
289 See also  Akers v. Alvey, 338 F.3d 491, 499 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that as a
matter of law the environment alleged was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to
constitute retaliatory harassment for plaintiff’s sexual harassment complaints of over
thirty incidents of inappropriate behavior by her supervisor, where, after plaintiff
complained, the defendant involuntarily transferred plaintiff to another office, and
during the two weeks that the employer investigated her complaints, her supervisor
refused to speak to her, instructed her coworkers to refuse to associate with her,
withheld her mail and inter-office memoranda, and criticized her work); Ottman v.
City of Independence, 341 F.3d 751, 760 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the lower court
erred in refusing to grant summary judgment because as a matter of law plaintiff
failed to show that the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive where
the alleged harasser had belittled the work of the plaintiff and that of other women,
but had not belittled the work of the men, had belittled women’s abilities, had cut
off plaintiff’s conversation with a city employee, had spoken in a condescending
manner to the plaintiff as if she were a child, had made the comment twice, “It’s just
like a woman,” referring to two women who disagreed with him, had occasionally
referred to the women as the “girls,” and where another woman had told the plain-
tiff that “we need more men,” and “be quiet, men are talking”); Dattoli v. Principi,
332 F.3d 505, 506 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment against hostile work
environment claim because, after separating “several” incidents that were “plainly
based” on gender from other harassing acts that were not apparently based on gen-
der, concluding they were not severe or pervasive as a matter of law); Alagna v.
Smithville R-II Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 975, 977-79 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming lower
court’s grant of summary judgment because the conduct was not sufficiently severe
or pervasive where the alleged harasser, a tenured teacher, over a period of one-
and-a-half years, persistently called the plaintiff at home over twenty times one sum-
mer and three times during Christmas break, talked to her about his failing mar-
riage, visited her office two or three times a week during one semester, regularly
touched her arm, told her he “loved her” and that she looked nice, placed two ro-
mance novels in her mailbox at work, stopped her in the hallway often, and gave her
a gift and told her to open it alone); Stinnett v. Safeway, Inc., 337 F.3d 1213, 1219
(10th Cir. 2003) (affirming the lower court’s grant of summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim because the harassment was insufficiently
severe or pervasive where the plaintiff alleged that the women employees were sub-
ject to more onerous working conditions than their male counterparts, including
cleaning underneath the checkstands in a supermarket and being sent to work in
more remote locations, as well as receiving less training than the men); Kirk v. City
of Tulsa, No. 02-5138, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 14387 (10th Cir. July 16, 2003) (hold-
ing that eight instances of harassment, with two being overtly gender-based, insuffi-
cient to create a cause of action).
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and conditions of employment is the failure to recognize that
non-sexual gender-based harassment can be equally as damaging
as sexually explicit behavior and can, either alone, or in combina-
tion with sexually explicit behavior, create a hostile working en-
vironment.  Law professor Vicki Schultz has criticized the courts
for disaggregating sex-based evidence of a hostile work environ-
ment because of sex from evidence of non-sexual gender-based
hostility.  Schultz demonstrates in Reconceptualizing Sexual Har-
assment  that when faced with evidence of a sexual and a non-
sexual nature the courts separate the two types of evidence, con-
sidering only the non-sexual evidence in determining whether a
gender-based harassment claim exists and only the sexual evi-
dence in deciding whether a sexual harassment claim exists.290
By disaggregating both types of evidence, the courts often reach
the conclusion that the harassment is not sufficiently severe or
pervasive to constitute either gender-based harassment or sexual
harassment.  Schultz argues that courts should look at all types of
harassment occurring because of sex, whether the harassing be-
havior is sexual in nature or not.291  When considering whether a
hostile work environment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
create a cause of action, the courts must consider all types of
evidence creating this environment.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. ,292 decided just as
Schultz’s article went to press, appears to affirm this approach.  It
comments that an environment in which the hostilities are not
sexual in nature can create a cause of action if there is a hostile
work environment created because of sex.293  Since Oncale , how-
ever, many courts continue to hold as a matter of law that non-
sexual behavior at work, either alone, or combined with sexual
behavior, is insufficiently severe or pervasive to create a cause of
action for hostile work environment.294  In these cases, courts
290 Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment , supra  note 23, at 1713-29.
291 Id . at 1796-1805.
292 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
293 See supra  notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
294 See supra note 289; see also Kirk , 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 14387 (holding that
eight instances of harassment, with two being overtly gender-based, insufficient to
create a cause of action); Shoemaker-Stephen v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Comm’rs, 262 F.Supp. 2d 866, 884 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (holding that as a matter of law
the plaintiff had not created a triable issue as to whether her treatment was because
of sex even though there were at least two gender-based comments and other em-
ployees agreed that the supervisor treated women more harshly). But see  O’Rourke
v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 729 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating “sex based harass-
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pay lip service to the concept that both sexual and non-sexual
gender-based harassment should be aggregated to constitute a
hostile work environment based on sex, but they often ignore
their own mandates.
While sexual advances, touchings, and jokes may be easier to
identify as harmful to women, many non-sexual behaviors that
occur at work may contribute to a hostile work environment be-
cause of a woman’s sex.  These non-sexual behaviors may appear
less harmful in part because the differentiation between women
and men based on their biological sex appears natural.  In effect,
many of these non-sexual behaviors are invisible; nonetheless,
masculinities research suggests that despite their invisibility, they
can be quite harmful to women.295
Expert testimony concerning research on masculinities should
be a valuable resource for judges to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence of severity or pervasiveness for the claim to
go to the fact finder.  Furthermore, this research should aid fact
finders in determining whether a reasonable person under the
circumstances of the job would consider the harassment suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of
employment.296
This research can be particularly helpful in reinforcing a plain-
ment that is not overtly sexual is nonetheless actionable under Title VII, so evidence
of that sort may be admissible”); O’Shea v. Yellow Tech. Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 1093,
1097 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating “[f]acially neutral abusive conduct can support a find-
ing of gender animus sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim when
that conduct is viewed in the context of other, overtly gender-discriminatory
conduct”).
295 See  Martin, supra  note 22, at 361 (noting that “hidden and subtle but wide-
spread and invidious forms of gender discrimination . . . perpetuat[e] men’s advan-
tage and women’s disadvantage”).
296 The admissibility of this expert testimony should be determined by the trial
judge in accordance with the principles set forth by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc ., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  In Daubert , the Court held that the Federal Rules of
Evidence overruled the common law rule that expert opinion be “generally ac-
cepted” as reliable for it to be admissible. Id . at 589.  The Court required, however,
that scientific expert evidence be reliable and relevant under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702; factors to be considered as to the reliability are whether the theory has
been tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, whether
the particular technique has a high error rate, whether there are standards that con-
trol the technique’s operation, and whether the technique is generally accepted in a
relevant scientific community. Id . at 593-95; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 141-42 (1999) (holding that Daubert  applies to technical or other expert
knowledge but that the rule is flexible and the factors to be considered by the judge
in her gatekeeping capacity will vary depending on the knowledge of the expert and
the facts of the case).  In response to Daubert  and Kumho , Federal Rule of Evi-
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tiff’s cause of action that comprises, in whole or in part, non-
sexual, gender-based harassment that is less visible than overtly
sexual behavior.  Masculinities theory can make visible to the
judge and jury the structures and practices in a particular work-
place that privilege men over women even though they may ap-
pear to be “natural” or “neutral” on issues of gender.
Masculinities studies can also legitimate the “petty” complaints
many women have about the workplace environment that they
fear to express, or if expressed, are not taken seriously.297 One
problem women often have in proving that the environment is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work envi-
ronment is that courts tend to dismiss individual acts that appear
to be petty, ignoring the structures surrounding these acts and
the difficulty they create for women at work, often concluding, as
a matter of law, that the environment created is not sufficiently
severe or pervasive for the case to go to a jury.298
dence 702 was amended to add the Daubert  requirements.  Rule 702 states
currently:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
Expert testimony based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
must be useful to the finder of fact, the witness must be qualified as an expert, and
the evidence proposed must be reliable or trustworthy. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FED. EVID. § 702.02[3] (Joseph M. McLaugh-
lin ed., 2d ed. 2002).  Broad discretion is granted to the trial judge to determine the
admissibility of the evidence. Id .  The danger of confusing a fact finder with the
expert evidence is better controlled through cross-examination than through refus-
ing to admit the evidence. Id .
In considering whether an expert should be permitted to testify on masculinities in
a sex discrimination case, the court should consider the qualifications of the expert,
whether the expert’s information on masculinities has been vetted by peer review
journals and publication, and whether the particular expert is applying masculinities
studies properly to the facts at issue.  The acceptance of masculinities theory and
research in the field of sociology should guarantee its reliability, especially if the
proposed expert has published studies or theories in peer-reviewed journals or in
books that are considered to be academic treatises.
297 Judith Lorber describes some of these behaviors as “microinequities.” LOR-
BER, supra  note 7, at 250 (citing Beth E. Schneider, Approaches, Assaults, Attrac-
tions, Affairs: Policy Implications of the Sexualization of the Workplace , 4
POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 93, 104 (1985)).
298 See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
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These acts, however, must be aggregated in order to perceive a
clear view of the environment.  In National Railroad Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan , the Supreme Court emphasized the difference
between a case alleging a hostile working environment based on
race and a race discrimination case alleging one or more discrete
acts that constitute an adverse employment action.299  In cases
where “discrete acts” occur such as termination, failure to pro-
mote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire, each incident consti-
tutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice.300  For
these claims, the plaintiff cannot recover for discrete acts occur-
ring outside of the statute of limitations.301  In contrast, the Court
emphasized, hostile work environment cases, by their very defini-
tion, involve repeated conduct, which because of its cumulative
effect creates a hostile environment.302  Therefore, unlike cases
of discrete acts of discrimination, cases alleging a hostile work
environment are timely if merely one act contributing to the
claim occurs within the statute of limitations.303
In sum, masculinities theory and field research provide a rich
theoretical and practical expertise that can help the judge and
jury define whether a particular series of practices, whether sex-
ual or non-sexual or both, would potentially cause an objectively
hostile work environment for a “reasonable woman” or a “rea-
sonable person” under all of the circumstances.
D. Juries and Masculinities Theory
One possible reaction to my proposal is that the use of mascu-
linities studies to create a genuine issue of material fact will leave
too much power to the jury to decide that the employer discrimi-
nated “because of sex,” or that the harassment was “severe or
pervasive,” resulting in a large number of verdicts for plaintiffs
alleging hostile work environments.  I do not anticipate such
problems.  First, I do not recommend that judges automatically
deny summary judgment in hostile environment cases; rather, I
299 536 U.S. 101, 122 (2002) (holding that acts outside of the 180 or 300-day statute
of limitations period can be redressed under Title VII hostile work environment
claims, but cannot be redressed in claims for violations of Title VII based on discrete
acts such as demotions, promotions, etc.).
300 Id . at 114.
301 Id .
302 Id . at 115-16.
303 Id . at 117.  The Court also noted that race and sexual harassment cases use the
same standards. Id . at 116 n.10.
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urge that because of the existence of masculinities, visible and
invisible, that deny women and gender-nonconforming men
equal opportunities at work, judges should act thoughtfully, fully
aware of masculinities in the workplace, before granting sum-
mary judgment to a defendant in a hostile work environment
case.
Judges should not be concerned that a jury hearing a hostile
work environment case will automatically rule for the plaintiff.
While there needs to be more empirical data concerning how ju-
ries react, social science research on behavior suggests that ju-
rors, as well as judges, will likely lean toward affirming the status
quo.  Experiments in behavior demonstrate that people have a
bias in favor of the status quo and an aversion to extremes.304
Masculinities studies demonstrate that invisible masculinities are
the status quo at work and in American homes.  Juries, like
judges, will likely tend toward reinforcing this status quo, refus-
ing to give much weight to the experts’ testimony concerning
masculinities.  Due to the status quo bias that I believe will oper-
ate with juries and judges’ decision making, I am less concerned
that juries will adopt the conclusions of the expert sociologists
who study masculinities; I have a greater concern that juries will
reject the experts’ testimony outright because it tends to conflict
with the status quo.  For this reason, I urge judges to permit the
jury to hear the expert testimony and to emphasize to the jury
the importance of the testimony in their decision making process.
CONCLUSION:
ELIMINATING MASCULINITIES FROM THE LAW OF WORK
Masculinities theory should redefine sex discrimination cases
decided under Title VII.  As demonstrated above, theoretical
and empirical work in masculinities makes visible the structures
and practices that damage women and gender non-conforming
304 See  Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to  BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 3-4
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal De-
cision Making , in  BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 61-76 (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000) (noting that the number of options available to a person in legal decision-
making may affect the outcome because people tend to move away from the ex-
tremes and to compromise); Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract For-
mation, and Contract Law , in  BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116-43 (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000) (noting the existence of a body of research demonstrating that
persons tend to favor the status quo or default rules in contract negotiations); see
also  Korobkin, supra  note 244, at 1613-17, 1620-26.
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men at work.  This research is valuable because it contradicts the
notion that women “choose” to work in less equal positions.
Masculinities can prove that differential treatment that is invisi-
ble or subtle to some, or even natural to others, can support a sex
discrimination claim if that treatment reinforces sex stereotypes
or is based on opportunities created by informal relationships,
paternalism, entrepreneurialism, careerism, or authoritarianism
at work.
Masculinities theory can also demonstrate that particular prac-
tices occur “because of sex” and that they are sufficiently “severe
or pervasive” to create a hostile work environment for women or
men who do not conform to gender expectations.
Finally, I believe that additional research on masculinities will
enable the courts, litigants, lawyers, and juries to understand the
complex nature of gender and the role it plays at work.  For
many of us, gender is obvious, but difficult to describe.  For
others, it is invisible, but present.  The masculinities studies can
confirm the legitimacy of concerns raised by women and gender-
nonconforming men.  It can help overcome the persistent ine-
qualities at work that account in large part for the great gender
gap in pay and promotions and the seemingly impenetrable glass
ceiling.  With the courts’ use of masculinities theory and field
studies, employers should become more aware of the “built-in
headwinds”305 women experience because of the ways in which
society defines work as masculine.  If the courts recognize the
usefulness of masculinities studies, this recognition should create
an incentive for employers to eliminate the practices that harm
women and their families.  Through further field research in mas-
culinities and the use of these studies and masculinities theory in
courtrooms and in boardrooms, women should be able to de-
velop in their careers beyond the fetus-like creatures depicted by
Salvador Dali in The Persistence of Memory , beyond the dynamic
stasis, truly leaving behind inequality at work as a memory that
fades with time.
305 Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
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